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Analysing Risk Preferences and Time Preferences with 
respect to Smoking Status and Smoking Intensity 
 
Abstract 
Smoking is a leading cause of death worldwide, and thus the behavioural components need to 
be understood to mitigate the damage caused by the practice. The relationship between 
smoking and factors such as risk preferences and time preferences has been the subject of a 
growing body of literature. This paper evaluates experimental data from smokers and non-
smokers at the University of Cape Town collected in 2016 and 2017. Maximum likelihood 
estimation is used to estimate models of risk preferences and time preferences. The results 
highlight that smokers are less risk averse than non-smokers; that smokers discount more 
heavily than non-smokers; that greater smoking intensity is correlated with lower risk 
aversion; and that greater smoking intensity is not related to discounting behaviour. In some 
specifications the relationship between smoking intensity and risk aversion is parabolic, and 
as such moderate smokers are less risk averse than heavy smokers and light smokers.  In 
conclusion, smokers tend to discount more heavily than non-smokers, and lower smoking 
intensity is associated with greater risk aversion than higher smoking intensity. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
Tobacco is one of the most widely used addictive substances in the world and its use 
constitutes the greatest non-communicable risk factor for mortality globally. It causes the 
death of millions and the sickness of millions more. Over the years there has been significant 
medical study of the effects of tobacco smoking and governments have come to recognise it 
as a pressing public health concern. This has led governments to pursue public health 
interventions to curb tobacco use, and, while the medical consequences of tobacco use are 
well understood, the relationships between economic preferences (risk preferences and time 
preferences) and smoking variables (smoking status and smoking intensity) are less well 
understood. 
Much of the existing research into why people smoke has been done by psychologists. 
However, there is an increasing body of economic literature regarding both theoretical 
models of addiction as well as experimental investigations into the correlates of addictive 
behaviours. Risk preferences and time preferences have been honed in upon as possible 
factors which may differ between people who use tobacco and people who do not.  
There are many complexities involved in measuring risk and time preferences, some include: 
how do people value different amounts of money? Do people accurately conceive 
probabilities or do they subjectively weight probabilities? How do people calculate the 
present value of future amounts? There are additional complexities regarding the 
experimental aspect of the investigation, for instance: Is it necessary to pay subjects for their 
choices? What experimental methods should be used to best elicit preferences? 
This thesis will investigate the link between tobacco use, risk preferences, and time 
preferences using methods from experimental economics and structural econometrics. 
Tobacco use will be analysed across two metrics: smokers vs. non-smokers, and across 
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smoking intensity. The data will be analysed across a range of statistical specifications to 
ensure the results are robust to various theoretical and econometric assumptions. 
The broad findings are that smokers and non-smokers differ with respect to time preferences 
but not risk preferences, with smokers discounting the future more than non-smokers. While 
among smokers: greater smoking intensity (number of cigarettes smoked per day) is 
associated with a difference in risk preferences but not time preferences, with greater 
smoking intensity being associated with less risk aversion. 
Section 2 reviews the literature. Firstly, it contextualises tobacco use historically, in the 
world, and in South Africa, as well as considering the cost associated with smoking. It then 
relates tobacco use to economic theory by considering the nature of addiction and how 
addiction can be modelled in economic terms. Finally, it considers the literature on how 
smoking relates to risk and time preferences, comparing how these preferences vary across 
smoking status (smokers vs. non-smokers) as well as across smoking intensity (such as 
cigarettes smoked per day).  
Section 3 describes the experimental design and displays the sample summary statistics. 
Section 4 describes the statistical methods used to analyse the data.  
Section 5 presents the results. Firstly, the risk preferences of smokers and non-smokers are 
compared using expected utility models and rank dependant utility models. Secondly, the 
time preferences of smokers and non-smokers are compared using a range of discounting 
parameters and utility functions. Thirdly, the risk preferences of smokers are analysed in 
terms of smoking intensity, with a variety of utility functions and smoking intensity metrics 
being used. Finally, the time preferences of smokers are analysed in terms of smoking 
intensity, with a variety of utility functions, discounting parameters, and smoking intensity 
metrics being used.  
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Section 6 provides a discussion of the results, contextualising them within the existing 
literature and considering the differences between specifications – specifically different 
metrics of smoking intensity. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
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Section 2: Literature Review 
a. The Context   
The practice of smoking tobacco dates back to 4000 BC in Mesoamerica.  It was used for a 
variety of reasons, ranging from purported medicinal benefits and appetite suppression to 
religious ceremonies.  Upon contact with Spaniards, tobacco smoking was adopted readily by 
the colonisers and later, the inhabitants of Europe itself, albeit primarily as a luxury 
commodity rather than for religious reasons or purported medicinal benefits (Haustein & 
Groneberg, 2009).   
Tobacco consumption quickly became popular, and with its meteoric rise in popularity came 
various restrictions on its trade and condemnation of its use.  In the early 1600s, England put 
a ban on Spanish tobacco in order to bolster the nascent English tobacco industry, and taxes 
and duties on tobacco proved to be lucrative sources of government income.  Similarly, in 
1742, Prussia banned tobacco smoking due to the associated risk of fire.  The 1800s saw 
some of the first scientific inquiries into tobacco, which resulted in various anti-tobacco 
organisations (Haustein & Groneberg, 2009).  
By the early 1900s, the consumption of tobacco was widespread in the Western world. Its 
consumption was bolstered by the inclusion of cigarettes in World War I and World War II 
rations, as well as marketing campaigns to convince women to smoke cigarettes – smoking 
had previously been an exclusively male practice (Haustein & Groneberg, 2009).   
German scientists in the 1920s were the first to note the connection between smoking and 
lung cancer.  Germany was the first state to embark on a comprehensive campaign against the 
smoking of tobacco: condemning its use, funding research on the subject, applying specific 
bans on its consumption, banning its advertisement, and putting into place taxes on its sale 
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(Young, 2005, p 252).  However, after the war the Allied powers failed to appropriate the 
German scientific findings regarding tobacco (Proctor, 1996).  
After World War II numerous scientific studies were published in the UK and the US which 
suggested a relationship between smoking and lung cancer.  This inquiry caused the tobacco 
industry to pursue marketing campaigns which suggested that smoking was not dangerous 
(e.g., “More doctors smoke Camels than any other cigarette”). However, as the relationship 
between smoking and lung cancer became unequivocal and widely accepted, advertising 
strategies stopped claiming that smoking benefits one‟s health (Gardner & Brandt, 2006). In 
1964 a report on the relationship between smoking and health was published by the Surgeon 
General of the US.  This report named smoking a health hazard, and is often credited as the 
turning point in US public opinion on smoking (Young, 2005).   
This change in perception has led to a decrease in smoking prevalence globally, and 
specifically in the developed world.  However, global statistics belie salient differences 
between countries: in a large proportion of less regulated and less informed developing 
countries smoking prevalence has increased and in some such countries is projected to 
increase further.  The magnitude of this shift is such that smoking prevalence is now greater 
in developing countries than it is in developed countries; prevalence was greater in developed 
countries up until 1990 (Ng et al., 2014).  
The World Health Organisation (WHO) (2009) found that tobacco use represents the highest 
non-communicable global risk factor for mortality – being responsible for 9% of deaths 
globally (while high blood pressure is responsible for 13%).  This is equivalent to 6 million 
deaths per year and $500 billion in economic damages, and constitutes the leading cause of 
preventable death (World Health Organization, 2013).  Smoking was found (in 2012) to be 
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significantly more prevalent globally among males (31%) than it is among females (6%) (Ng 
et al., 2014).  
Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) is a way of measuring the impact of a disease or 
condition on people‟s lives without directly referring to mortality. Globally in 2009, tobacco 
use ranks sixth for most DALYs lost at 3.7% of the total; however, in middle-income 
countries smoking ranks third, accounting for 5.4%.  In comparison, alcohol is third globally 
(4.5%) and first in middle-income countries (7.6%) (World Health Organization, 2009). 
Smoking prevalence in Africa is predicted to rise, while smoking prevalence in South Africa 
is predicted to fall (World Health Organization, 2015).  The South African gender differences 
in smoking prevalence are similar to global rates – with 29% of males and 7% of females 
smoking.  Smoking is most common among Coloured adults, followed by Indians, Whites, 
and black Africans (Reddy et al., 2015).  
The South African government employs a range of strategies to dissuade people from 
smoking.  The measures include a sin tax on the sale of tobacco products, a ban on the 
advertising and promotion of smoking products, restrictions on where smokers can smoke 
(e.g., smokers cannot smoke within restaurants, unless they are in a designated smoking 
area), and prohibiting people under the age of 18 from buying or selling tobacco products 
(Rose-Innes, 2017).  The South African government is currently considering putting in place 
further measures to dissuade smoking, such as plain packaging and other further restrictions 
(Van Der Merwe, 2016).  
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b. Smoking and Economic Theory 
Smoking presents an interesting economic quandary from a theoretical perspective: given that 
smokers often profess regret regarding their habit, why do they smoke?  This problem 
generalises to all addictive behaviours.  To investigate it this paper will briefly consider: what 
addiction is; whether addiction is best characterised by disease or choice models; and how 
different economic models seek to explain addiction. 
The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5, 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p 571) defines tobacco use disorder as: 
“A problematic pattern of tobacco use leading to clinically significant impairment or 
distress, as manifested by at least two of the following, occurring within a 12-month 
period:” 
following which is a list of 11 diagnostic criteria.
1
  The definition and criteria, while adapted 
to smoking in this case, are general and applicable to all substance-related and addictive 
disorders.  A disorder is considered mild if the individual presents 2-3 criteria; moderate, 4-5 
criteria; and severe, 6 or more criteria. 
There have been a number of criticisms of the DSM, such as: the criteria used to judge 
addictive disorders are open to interpretation – “How harmful do the consequences have to be 
for them to count?”; “addiction” has changed from describing the behaviour to explaining the 
behaviour (Ross et al., 2012); and, it is possible to have 5 individuals with mild disorders (2 
symptoms each) who do not share any overlapping symptoms.   
                                                          
1
 For example, “There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control tobacco use.”  
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While issues do exist regarding the definition of addiction in the DSM-5, it is nonetheless the 
most widely used diagnostic instrument for tobacco use disorder and the result of decades of 
refinement. 
Addiction: choice or disease? 
The DSM-5 describes what criteria to look for in order to diagnose addictive behaviour, but it 
does not describe the mechanisms which drive it.  An example of why this is important is the 
question: is addiction a disease or the outcome of choices made by an economic agent?  The 
answer to this question determines the degree to which addiction is a function of agency, and 
has implications regarding related behaviours and policy interventions. 
Among the first scientific proponents of the disease model of addiction was the Journal of 
Inebriety, which was published in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries (as described by 
Weiner and White (2007)).   The journal explicitly stated that intemperance (alcohol 
addiction) is a disease which can be cured similarly to how other diseases are cured, and that 
it can be inherited or acquired.   
This model was opposed by the public of the time, as it described the state of the inebriated 
not to be a function of their agency, but rather a function of exogenous factors.  This was seen 
as excusing or even encouraging the excessive consumption of alcohol (Weiner & White, 
2007). 
Addiction is defined as a disease by various modern organisations, such as: the American 
Society of Addiction Medicine (2011); the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 
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Alcoholism (2017); and, the National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence (2015).  
For example, the American Society of Addiction Medicine (2011) defines
2
 addiction thus: 
“Addiction is a primary, chronic disease of brain reward, motivation, memory and 
related circuitry. Dysfunction in these circuits leads to characteristic biological, 
psychological, social and spiritual manifestations. This is reflected in an individual 
pathologically pursuing reward and/or relief by substance use and other behaviors. 
Addiction is characterized by inability to consistently abstain, impairment in 
behavioral control, craving, diminished recognition of significant problems with one‟s 
behaviors and interpersonal relationships, and a dysfunctional emotional response. 
Like other chronic diseases, addiction often involves cycles of relapse and remission. 
Without treatment or engagement in recovery activities, addiction is progressive and 
can result in disability or premature death.” 
 All three definitions referenced above describe addiction as a chronic, often-relapsing brain 
disease characterised by the compulsive or pathological use of drugs.  
Heyman (2009) challenges the disease model of addiction on matters relating to genetics and 
agency.  Heyman points out that addicts choose to quit their drug habits for reasons such as 
wanting to be better parents, to avoid potential legal ramifications, and financial constraints.  
In addition, addicts respond to drug prices, and contingency management programmes have 
been effective at incentivising addicts to quit.  These facts challenge the idea that addiction is 
compulsive behaviour and instead suggest that addiction is voluntary behaviour, which is 
moderated as a function of the costs and benefits which accrue to the individual. Heyman 
(2009) further notes that, while addiction has a genetic underpinning, genes do not 
                                                          
2
 The definition presented here is the short definition, as opposed to the long definition which is more technical; 
see https://www.asam.org/resources/definition-of-addiction for more details. 
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deterministically predict addiction and that social and environmental factors play a 
contributing role.   
A synthesis of the disease and choice models of addiction is proposed by Ross et al. (2012): 
the models are not contradictory because they approach the problem at different levels of 
analysis.   Heyman‟s choice model analyses addiction at the behavioural level, while the 
disease model understands addiction at the molecular level.  According to this thesis, these 
two levels of analysis complement, rather than contradict, each other. 
I investigate the potential behavioural correlates of tobacco smoking so this study is in the 
tradition of Heyman (2009). But, given the reconciliation provided by Ross et al. (2012), this 
is not inconsistent with a molecular account of addiction. 
Economic models of addiction 
This paper will now consider economic models of addiction, notwithstanding the fact that 
behavioural analyses do not fully explain the phenomenon of addiction.  
The model of rational addiction, developed by Becker and Murphy (1988), is designed to 
explain addiction based on the rational choices of an economic agent.  The agent maximises 
utility over time where utility depends on a stock of addictive capital, and consumption of 
addictive and non-addictive goods. Importantly, the marginal utility of the addictive good 
depends on the stock of addictive capital – as the stock of addictive capital increases the 
marginal utility of the addictive good increases (this simulates addiction).  Agents have 
complete information of future events and discount exponentially, thereby ensuring that their 
choices are consistent across time. 
This model allows for aspects of addiction, such as: tolerance (increased consumption of the 
addictive good increases the addictive stock and thus results in decreased future utility), 
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withdrawal (deceased consumption of the addictive good leads to a short-term fall in utility), 
and the crowding out of non-addictive goods (increased consumption of the addictive good 
leads to a decrease in the marginal utility of the non-addictive good). 
A criticism of this model is that while it captures consumption through time, it does not 
incorporate stochastic uncertainty (e.g., will a smoker get lung cancer or not). Another 
criticism is that the model implies that addicts choose to become addicted, but this disregards 
the possibility that some addicts regret their addiction, or that addiction is voluntary but 
unintentional. 
Over time the literature grew to incorporate models which accounted from incomplete 
information and stochastic uncertainty. Orphanides and Zervos (1995) develop a model based 
on that of Becker and Murphy where addictive goods are not equally harmful to all, and 
where the degree to which the addictive good is addictive and harmful to an individual is 
unknown initially. Individuals update their beliefs regarding how they are affected by 
additive goods as they consume them. The consumption decisions are optimal in an expected 
utility maximising sense and dynamically consistent given the information available. 
This model allows for behaviour such as “trying a drug once” and hoping that one does not 
suffer great harm nor become heavily addicted.  It is more realistic than purely deterministic 
models, however, agents are still assumed to be rational and time consistent for their given 
knowledge. 
The literature further expanded to incorporate time-inconsistent behaviour, which is 
behaviour characterised by preferences shifting over time.
3
 Dual Self models, such as that of 
Fudenberg and Levine (2006), describe a model where an individual has two “selves” – one 
self is more short-run (SR) oriented and the other self is more long-run (LR) oriented. These 
                                                          
3
 For example, deciding in the morning that you will go for a run in the evening, but in the evening you do not 
go for a run. 
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selves “fight” for control over the individual – as the cost of self-control increases the 
preferences of the SR self supersede those of the LR self.  This leads to the agents being able 
to make time-inconsistent choices. 
In Fudenberg and Levine (2012), the original 2006 model is expanded upon by including a 
stock of willpower which affects how current choices affect future decisions. Other literature 
in this area includes Chatterjee and Krishna (2009), who describe a two period stochastic 
model in which the SR self takes control in the second period with some probability. 
The Fudenberg and Levine (2012) model differs significantly from the earlier Becker and 
Murphy model. It is stochastic, incorporates risk preferences, and allows for time-inconsistent 
choices.  It also accounts for features of addiction such as relapse after a quit attempt, and the 
regret many addicts feel with regard to their first use of drugs. 
These theoretical economic models of addiction, while differing in form, suggest the 
importance of investigating the relationship between risk preferences, time preferences, and 
addiction. The variety and complexity of the models of addiction suggests the importance of 
careful experimental design and valid statistical practices to accommodate the underlying 
theory. 
c. Smoking: Risk Preferences and Time Preferences 
Many studies have investigated the link between risk preferences, time preferences, and 
smoking behaviour.  Studies have used different metrics and practices, often updated by 
theoretical refinement and empirical findings.  To investigate these matters, this paper will 
consider: smoking and risk preferences; smoking and time preferences; smoking intensity, 
and risk preferences and time preferences. 
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Smoking and Risk Preferences 
An intuitive link between smoking and risk preferences is that a less risk averse agent may be 
willing to enjoy the benefits of smoking at the expense of the possibility of a serious illness 
(e.g., lung cancer). In this section I will review two older studies in this literature, discuss the 
key findings and pitfalls of the literature, and discuss the methods and findings of more recent 
studies. 
Mitchell (1999) conducted a study on adults in the US and compared the choices of 20 
smokers and 20 “never-smokers”.4  Subjects were asked to choose between: option one which 
paid $10 with various probabilities (ranging from 0.1 to 1) and $0 with the complementary 
probability; and, option 2 which paid out an amount with certainty, where these amounts 
varied from ($0.01-$10.50).  The options were randomly ordered and the subjects were paid 
for one of the questions of this task, chosen at random. 
Risk attitude was modelled using probability discounting, which is a method of analysing 
choices made under risk by interpreting the probability of a reward as a delay to the reward. 
Non-linear least squares regression (NLLS) was used to estimate point estimates of risk 
aversion, which refers to aversion to variability of outcomes.
5
 Point estimates were used as 
data for analysis, and no relationship was found between smoking and risk aversion. 
Reynolds et al. (2004) sampled 25 smokers and 29 never-smokers from the adult population 
of the US. Subjects were required to choose between $10 received with some associated 
probability (ranging over 0.25-1) and a smaller amount received with certainty.  The smaller 
amount was increased if the $10 option had been chosen previously and the smaller amount 
                                                          
4
 Smokers were defined as people who smoked 15 or more cigarettes a day.  “Never smokers” were defined as 
people who had never smoked a cigarette in their life. 
5
 Likewise, risk neutrality indicates that an individual will be indifferent between rewards which have the same 
expected value (regardless of differences in probability), and risk-loving behaviours indicate that an individual 
is willing to accept a risky reward over a safer reward. 
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was reduced if the smaller amount had been chosen previously.
6
 This method is known as 
titration. The risk preference choices were interspersed with time preference choices. 
Subjects were paid either for a choice on the risk preference task or the time preference task, 
drawn at random. 
Risk preferences were modelled using probability discounting. NLLS was used to estimate 
point estimates of risk aversion, and point estimates were used as data for analysis.  Smokers 
were found to be less risk averse than never-smokers, which accords with our basic intuition 
that smokers are less risk averse than never-smokers. 
In addition to these studies, there are a large number of studies with various experimental 
designs and statistical methods.  The aspects of design and methods which will be considered 
are: incentive size and nature, sample size and composition, elicitation, probability range, 
utility model, and statistical methods. 
Hypothetical prizes are not incentive compatible – i.e., there are no costs for wrong answers 
so how do you know subjects are answering truthfully, and even an earnest subject may 
respond differently when there‟s money on the line.  A real prize which is too small may also 
not be incentive compatible, and relative rates of income for the time taken to complete the 
task should be taken into account. Hypothetical prizes (such as Ohmura et al. (2005) and Ida 
(2014)) and real prizes (such as Mitchell (1999), Reynolds et al. (2004), and Harrison et al. 
(2010)) are both fairly common in the literature but we should clearly lend more credence to 
studies employing real rewards. 
Sample size is important, as an insufficient sample size may not yield the statistical power 
necessary to draw valid statistical inferences. Hypothetical prizes reduce costs per subject 
                                                          
6
 For example, you choose between $10 with probability 0.75 and $5 with certainty. You choose $10.   
You now choose between $10 with probability 0.75 and $7.50 with certainty. You choose $7.50. 
You now choose between $10 with probability 0.75 and $6.25 with certainty, et cetera.   
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which allows for a larger sample, but hypothetical prizes have their own costs, as mentioned 
above.  Sample composition is another area where financial constraints limit what is ideal.  
Ideally the sample would be representative of the population in which you are working; 
however, this is expensive, and, while student samples may cost less, student samples may 
hinder the external validity of the study. 
Sample size varies significantly in the literature, from small samples with 0-100 subjects 
(such as Mitchell (1999) with 40 subjects and Reynolds et al. (2004) with 54 subjects), to 
medium samples with 101-300 subjects (such as Harrison et al. (2010) with 252 subjects and 
Harrison et al (2018) with 175 subjects), to large samples with over 300 subjects (such as Ida 
and Goto (2009) with 12530 subjects and Ida (2014) with 494 subjects).  Both large samples 
here had hypothetical prizes. 
The titration elicitation method is often used in this literature but it is vulnerable to being 
“gamed” if subjects realise the structure of the method.  If the subject chooses the higher 
amount, the lower amount increases in the next round, and so it might make sense for a 
subject to misrepresent his preferences for a chance at a larger prize.  This problem is 
partially mitigated by random ordering.  Another problem with titration is that it punishes 
mistakes made by the subject, which would lead to the mis-estimation of the subject‟s 
preferences.
7
   
As research in this field has progressed, the titration elicitation method has become less 
popular. In the early 2000s it was used in a variety of studies such as Reynolds et al. (2004) 
and Ohmura et al. (2005). More recently, the choice elicitation method has become more 
                                                          
7
For example, you choose between $10 with 0.75 probability and $5 with certainty. You choose $10.  
But suppose this is a mistake. You meant to choose $5. Your indifference point has a value less than $5. 
You now choose between $10 with 0.75 probability and $7.50 with certainty. You choose $7.50.  etc. 
Due to the narrowing range of choices you will never be able to choose a value less than $5.  Thus you are 
punished for an earlier mistake and can‟t reach your indifference point (and thus are always choosing riskier 
options than you would like to choose).   
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popular. In this method the subject makes a choice between two lotteries.  The values of the 
lotteries are not dependant on the previous choices of the subject, and thus do not have the 
pitfalls regarding mistakes and “gaming” present in titration. The choice elicitation method 
was used in studies such as Ida and Goto (2009) and Harrison et al. (2018). 
A small number of probabilities used in the lotteries may constrain the ability of a statistical 
model to determine the accurate estimates of preferences or utility. For example, Reynolds et 
al. (2004) used 5 probabilities ranging over [0.25,1], whereas Harrison et al. (2010) used 10 
probabilities evenly spaced over [0.1,1].  
A common mistake in the literature is that after point estimates for risk preference are 
estimated, these point estimates are subsequently used as data in further statistical analysis. 
This is not statistically valid as it disregards the uncertainty inherent in the original point 
estimates.  A more statistically valid approach is to use a method which incorporates the 
uncertainty of the original point estimates in the subsequent statistical analysis, such as that 
adopted by Harrison et al. (2010) and Harrison et al. (2018). 
An example of a methodologically sound study is Harrison et al. (2018) which sampled 108 
smokers and 67 non-smokers from the student population of the University of Cape Town, 
South Africa. Subjects made 40 choices in a choice method risk preference task, one of which 
was selected at random at the end of the experiment and paid out. The data were analysed 
using a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
8
 utility function over outcomes and various 
models of choice under risk, including Expected Utility (EU) Theory
9
 and Rank Dependent 
Utility (RDU) Theory.
10
  Maximum likelihood estimation was used to estimate risk 
preferences as a linear function of demographic characteristics and task parameters. The use 
                                                          
8
 As defined in Statistical Methods, equation (1). 
9
 As defined in Statistical Methods, equation (2). 
10
 As defined in Statistical Methods, equation (8). 
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of maximum likelihood estimation avoids the problem of using point estimates (of the risk 
preferences of individuals) as data. The study found that there were no statistically significant 
differences in the risk preference of smokers and non-smokers. 
Differences in designs and methods make the comparison of studies somewhat difficult – for 
example, how much does one weigh a study with hypothetical rewards versus one with real 
rewards? How much does one weigh a study that has a small sample versus one which has a 
medium or large sample?  However, a detailed review conducted by Harrison et al. (2018) 
shows that the relationship between risk preferences and smoking status is equivocal. 
Smoking and Time Preferences 
An intuitive link between smoking and time preferences is that a more present orientated 
agent may be willing to enjoy the benefits of smoking – which accrue in the short run – at the 
expense of the long run costs, which the agent discounts more than average. In this section, I 
will review two older studies, discuss the key findings and pitfalls of the literature, and 
discuss the methods and findings of more recent studies. 
In Mitchell (1999) the subjects were required to choose between “smaller sooner” (SS) 
amounts and “larger later” (LL) amounts of money.  The LL was always $10, while the delay 
to the LL varied between 0 and 365 days. The amount of the SS varied between $0.01 and 
$10.50, and the SS had no delay in payment (i.e., it was received immediately).  The time 
preference choices were randomly ordered and the subjects were paid for one of the questions 
of this task, chosen at random. 
The subjects were assumed to engage in hyperbolic discounting, as opposed to, for example, 
exponential discounting. The type of discounting will impact the degree to which costs or 
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benefits are discounted, with hyperbolic discounting leading to greater short term discounting 
than exponential discounting and the potential for time inconsistency.  
The possibility of non-linear utility was not considered.
11
  Non-linear least squares regression 
(NLLS) was used to estimate point estimates of the hyperbolic discounting parameters, and 
point estimates were used as data for analysis.  Mitchell found that smokers discounted more 
heavily than never-smokers. 
The subjects in Reynolds et al. (2004) had to choose between a constant LL of $10 with some 
delay ranging over 1-365 days and an SS with no delay which varied in amount.  The SS was 
increased in the following round if the LL was chosen and decreased in the following round if 
the SS was chosen. As with the risk preference task, titration was used in order to find the 
indifference point by narrowing the range of possible values it could take. The order was 
random and risk preference choices were intermixed with time preference choices.  Subjects 
were paid either for one of the choices from the time preferences task or the risk preference 
task, drawn at random. 
Like Mitchell, hyperbolic discounting was assumed and their model did not allow non-linear 
utility. NLLS was used to estimate point estimates of the hyperbolic discounting parameter, 
and point estimates were used as data for analysis.  It was found that smokers discounted 
more heavily than never-smokers. 
There are a large number of studies with various experimental designs and statistical 
methods, and (while we covered many of these differences in the risk preference section) a 
number of these differences are specific to time preferences.  The aspects of design and 
                                                          
11
 Linear utility describes the idea that utility increases linearly with e.g., money.  By way of example: if you 
double your money and your utility doubles then if you triple your money your utility will triple. Non-linear 
utility is the idea that an increase in money may result in a non-linear change to utility. This is important 
because if a subject has non-linear utility then his choices in a time preference task are a function of both his 
time preferences and his non-linear utility, and one must determine the relative strength of the parameters. 
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methods which will be considered are: time horizons, front end delays, utility functions, and 
discounting methods. 
Very long time horizons (beyond a year) have the problem of almost always using 
hypothetical rewards (such as Ohmura et al. (2005)), which, as mentioned above, leads to 
questionable results due to the tasks not being incentive compatible.  Furthermore, long time 
horizons with real prizes (such as Harrison et al. (2010)) may suffer from the problem of 
subjects doubting if the prize will be paid out, despite the best efforts of the researchers to 
alleviate such doubts. 
Front end delays (FEDs) is an experimental design where the SS amounts are not paid out 
immediately, but instead after some delay (such as a day or a week).  This is done to account 
for factors such as transaction costs, fears that the future payment will not be paid, and a 
present-bias or “passion for the present” any of which may cause mis-estimation of time 
preferences (Coller & Williams, 1999).
12
 Specifically, the zero day FED allows for the 
estimation of “present-bias”, while the seven day FED allows for estimation of long-term 
discounting. 
Most studies in the literature assume that utility is linear over monetary prizes.  This is not 
necessarily the case, as shown by Andersen et al. (2008). If the utility of a subject is non-
linear over money then this causes the estimate of the discounting parameter to be biased. A 
utility function over monetary prizes can be estimated jointly with the parameters of a time 
preference model and used to improve the accuracy of predictions of time preferences. 
                                                          
12
 By way of example: A subject might choose the SS amount over the LL amount not due to him preferring the 
SS amount on the basis of his time preference, but preferring the SS amount on the basis that he fears that the 
future payment will not occur and so he would rather take the immediate payment. 
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The choices of the subjects are often modelled using hyperbolic discounting by assumption in 
the literature. However, the choices of the subjects could be modelled using other discounting 
functions, such as exponential or quasi-hyperbolic.
13
 
Harrison et al. (2018) – the methodologically sound study from the previous section – 
approached time preferences by using risk preference data to estimate a utility function 
jointly with the parameters of a variety of discounting functions.  Three FEDs were used 
(immediate payment, 7 days, and 14 days), and the longest LL delay was 98 days.  Harrison 
et al. (2018) found that smokers had higher discount rates than non-smokers under every 
discounting specification. 
Similarly to risk preferences, the comparison of studies investigating time preferences is 
made difficult by the heterogeneity of the characteristics of the studies.  However, the 
literature, as reviewed in Harrison et al. (2018), appears to suggest that smokers discount the 
future at higher rates than non-smokers. 
Smoking intensity 
An intuitive link between risk preferences, time preferences, and smoking intensity is that 
perhaps heavier smokers are more risk-loving and discount more heavily than lighter or more 
moderate smokers. Put simply, perhaps not only whether a person smokes but also the degree 
to which a person smokes is correlated with risk and/or time preferences.  The literature on 
smoking intensity is somewhat sparser than that of the smoker versus non-smoker literature.  
A common metric of smoking intensity is the Fagerström Test for Nicotine Dependence 
(FTND) (Heatherton et al., 1991), which scores smokers on a scale from 0 to 10.
14
  
                                                          
13
 A quasi-hyperbolic function allows for time inconsistency, unlike an exponential function. The functional 
forms will be expounded upon in more detail in the Statistical Methods section. 
14
 1-2 indicates low dependence; 3-4, low-to-moderate; 5-7 moderate; 8-10, high. 
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In a study of Japanese adults, Ida and Goto (2009) found that heavy smokers tended to be less 
risk averse and discounted more heavily than light or moderate smokers, however the 
difference was not statistically significant.  Smoking intensity was measured using FTND.  
The sample size was large (12530 total), and hypothetical rewards were used.  A similar 
study by Ida (2014) found a statistically significant tendency for heavy smokers to discount 
more than light or moderate smokers, and for heavy smokers to be less risk averse.  The 
sample was also large (494 total). 
In a study of US adults, Reynolds et al. (2004) found that heavier smoking was statistically 
significantly correlated with greater discounting, but was not statistically significantly 
correlated with risk aversion.  Smoking intensity was measured biomedically using carbon 
monoxide (CO) testing.  The sample size was small (54 total) and subjects were compensated 
based on their choices. 
In a study of Japanese adults, Ohmura et al. (2005) found that heavier smoking was 
statistically significantly correlated with greater discounting (in monetary gains but not 
monetary losses). Heavier smoking was not statistically significantly correlated with risk 
aversion. Smoking intensity was measured using cigarettes smoked per day, as well as 
estimated nicotine intake per day.  The sample size was small (50 total) and the prizes were 
hypothetical. 
In a study of South African students, Harrison et al. (2018) found that the number of 
cigarettes smoked had a (positive) parabolic relationship with discounting, with light smokers 
discounting the least, medium to heavy smokers discounting the most, and very heavy 
smokers discounting slightly less than medium smokers.  Smoking intensity was measured 
using cigarettes smoked per day. The sample size was large (175 total) given that the prizes 
were not hypothetical. 
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There are fewer studies which investigate the link between risk preferences, time preferences, 
and smoking intensity than there are studies which compare smokers and non-smokers on 
those metrics.  Nevertheless, the literature suggests that heavier smokers discount more than 
lighter smokers, and that there is no significant difference between heavier smokers and 
lighter smokers with regard to risk preferences. 
I investigate whether these results hold in a sample of university students using an incentive 
compatible experimental design and a structural econometric approach to data analysis.  
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Section 3: Experimental Design and Summary Statistics 
The data used in this thesis were collected from two sets of experiments conducted at UCT.  
The first set of experiments was part of a study analysing intertemporal risk preferences and 
subjective beliefs regarding smoking, while the second set of experiments was a part of a 
smoking cessation programme study.
15
  The first set of experiments was run between 
November 2016 and March 2017, and the second set of experiments was run in August 2017.   
In all two sets of experiments, university students were contacted via email with an advert for 
the respective studies
16
, which included a link to an online sign-up survey and mentioned the 
range of earnings a subject could expect.
17
  A large number of people signed up for the first 
study and participants were randomly selected.  A small number of people signed up for the 
second study and all valid
18
 participants were selected.   
Subjects who were selected to take part in the experiments were added to a website which 
allowed for communication and organisation regarding their experimental sessions.  Subjects 
then chose a suitable time for their experimental session.  Prior to the experimental session 
subjects were reminded twice
19
 via text message of their upcoming session.  The 
experimental sessions were conducted in a computer lab at UCT.  For most subjects the 
computer lab would not have been more than a 10-minute walk away.   
The computer lab was set up with cardboard dividers between the computers so that subjects 
would not look at or be distracted by other nearby subjects.  On the computers software was 
                                                          
15
 The format of the cessation study was: screening, baseline, quit period, weekly follow-ups for a month, 3 and 
6 month follow-ups.  The data used in this thesis were taken from the baseline experiments. 
16
 The adverts for the first study sought smokers and non-smokers to take part in a behavioural experiment, 
while the advert for the second study sought smokers who wished to quit smoking. 
17
 For the first study: R400-R1500 ($67-$250 at PPP).  For the second study: R800-R2000 (over the entire 
cessation study; $133-$333 at PPP). 
18
 Participants in the second study were biochemically tested to prove that they were smokers and thus eligible 
for the programme. 
19
 The night before, and the morning of, the session. 
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opened which would capture the experimental choices made by the subjects; additionally, an 
internet browser based questionnaire and an explanatory video were also opened.  
Subjects were asked to arrive at the computer lab 15 minutes early and, once there, to wait 
quietly while a research assistant checked their name against a list.  The sessions were run by 
one researcher and a minimum of two research assistants.  The number of experimental 
sessions and size of the experimental sessions varied: for the eight sessions between 
November 2016 and March 2017 the median
20
 size was 18; and, for the seven August 2017 
sessions the median size was 12. 
Upon entry into the computer lab subjects were asked to remain silent and find a seat at a 
computer.  There was then a short introduction and students were asked to fill in an informed 
consent form.  Following this there was a presentation explaining the broad structure of the 
experiments, that the payment for each section would be calculated at the end of each task 
and communicated to the subject, and how this payment would be calculated.  If subjects had 
a question, they were invited to raise their hand and wait for a research assistant to answer it 
quietly in private. 
After the completion of the introduction, subjects were instructed to read some written 
material
21
 explaining the first task, and then subsequently watch a video with examples re-
iterating the explanation.   In the smoking cessation study (but not the earlier study) the first 
task would be either the risk preference task or the time preference task.  Following its 
completion subjects had their payment for the first task calculated in front of them using dice 
to randomly select one of their choices.  Subjects then read and watched a video for the 
second task.
22
  In the first experiment there were two additional tasks following the initial 
                                                          
20
 The mean sizes of the experimental sessions were 18 and 13, respectively. 
21
 With diagrams; which can be seen in appendix A. 
22
 The time preference task if the risk preference task was done first, and vice versa. 
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two: an intertemporal risk preference task and a subjective beliefs task.
23
  After the 
experimental tasks were finished, subjects completed a questionnaire on the computer.  At 
this point, in the second set of experiments subjects were taken to do biochemical tests.  All 
the sessions concluded with the subject being paid.  Subjects received R50 for participation 
and any experiment earnings which accrued on the day of the experiment, while future 
payments were made via electronic transfer into the student‟s bank account.24  The sessions 
lasted roughly 2 hours, and the average earnings were R919 and R604 for the first and second 
sets of experiments, respectively.
25
 
Risk Preference Task 
The risk preference task required subjects to choose between two lotteries on each screen 
presented to the subject on the computer.  The details of these lotteries were conveyed 
visually through pie charts, with textual descriptions accompanying below.  An example of 
the task can be seen in Figure 1 below.  Subjects made 90 choices over randomly ordered 
lottery pairs, after which one was randomly selected, and the earnings were calculated. 
The prizes ranged from R0 – R700 ($0 - $117 PPP), while the associated probabilities ranged 
from 0.1 to 1.  Some prizes were “double or nothing” – if the subject chose the lottery and it 
was randomly selected for payment, then the associated prize either would be doubled or the 
subject would receive nothing (each option with a 0.5 probability). 
  
                                                          
23
 This thesis will not analyse the data from the intertemporal risk preference task or the subjective beliefs task. 
24
 Students without bank accounts were not eligible for the experiments.  This did not appear to hinder sign ups. 
25
 The first experiment had four tasks, which is why there is a R300 difference. Comparing like with like, the 
average earnings of the first experiment was R573. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
The 90 risk preference lottery pairs were chosen to investigate a broad range of risk 
preferences, while accounting for the possibility that both utility functions and probability 
weighting functions could affect choice under risk.  The lotteries pairs were derived from 
four sources: 24 from Wakker, Erev, and Weber (1994); 30 from Harrison, Martinez-Correa, 
and Swarthout (2015); 6 from Cox and Sadiraj (2008); and, 30 from Loomes and Sugden 
(1998).  
The Wakker, Erev, and Weber lotteries were designed to test the comonotonic independence 
axiom of RDU.  The Cox and Sadiraj lotteries were designed to test whether subjects reacted 
differently when presented a “safe” vs a “risky” 26  lottery across a range of expected values – 
                                                          
26
 In a “safe” lottery the subject receives an amount with certainty, while in the “risky” the subject is presented 
with a lottery, the expected value of which is slightly higher than that of the safe lottery. The safe lottery has a 
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the idea here being that subjects may behave differently (in a more risk averse manner) when 
the lotteries have high expected values compared to when they have low expected values.  
The Harrison, Martinez-Correa, and Swarthout lotteries were designed to test the ability of 
subjects to reduce compound lotteries to simple lotteries.  This was achieved by presenting 
subjects with a “double or nothing” type lottery pair, as well as an actuarially equivalent 
simple lottery pair.  Finally, the Loomes and Sugden (LS) lotteries were designed to test EU 
by considering choice patterns within a Marschak-Machina (MM) triangle with variation in 
the gradient of EU-based indifference curves.  The prizes were the same across the LS lottery 
pairs (R60; R180; R300). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
wide variety of values from R60 to R540, while the risky lottery is consistently a 50-50 lottery with options of 
R30 (or R60) below and R40 (or R70) above that of the safe lottery. 
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The LS lotteries are represented above in Figure 2 in a MM triangle. Each point on the 
Marschak-Machina triangle represents a lottery, while two (or more) points connected by a 
line represents a lottery pair (or a set of lottery pairs).  The vertical axis represents the 
probability of the highest prize in the lottery (R300), the horizontal axis represents the lowest 
prize of the lottery (R60), and, the middle prize (R180) is represented by the complement of 
the sum of the probabilities of the other two prizes.
27
  The gradients of the lines connecting 
the lotteries represent risk preferences associated with the lottery pairs: a steeper gradient is 
associated with risk averse; a 45° gradient, risk neutral; a shallower gradient, risk-loving.
28
  
Figure 2 shows that the risk preference task provides good coverage of the MM triangle. 
Time Preference Task 
The time preference task required subjects to make 4 choices per screen.  Subjects would 
choose between SS amounts and LL amounts.  The SS amounts remained fixed over the 4 
choices, while the LL amounts increased over the 4 choices.  A calendar was displayed and 
the payment dates were highlighted, with textual descriptions accompanying below.  An 
example of the task can be seen in Figure 3.  Subjects made 60 choices, after which 1 was 
randomly selected, and the earnings were calculated. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 Visually: the R180 prize has a probability of 1 at the origin of the graph, and has a probability of 0 at any 
point along the dotted line. 
28
 In the case of a gradient greater than 1: the expected value of the “safer” lottery would be greater than the 
expected value of the “risky” lottery.  A gradient equal to 1 has lotteries of equal EVs. Finally, a gradient of less 
than 1 has a “safer” lottery with an EV less than that of the “risky” lottery. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Two Front end delays (FEDs) were used for the SS prizes: zero days and seven days.   Other 
design elements included: two principles (R250 and R400); four LL time horizons (7, 14, 42, 
and 84 days); and 14 nominal annual interest (rates ranging from 5% to 200%).  From these 
parameters a battery of 112 choice pairs were created, of which 60 were randomly selected 
without replacement for the subject to complete. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the sample are displayed in Table 1. The total number of subjects is 
235. Males make up 62% of the sample; the mean age is 22 years old
29
; 37% of the sample is 
Black, 21%, Coloured
30
, 16%, Indian, and, 22%, White.
31
 Smokers comprise roughly 50% of 
the November to March sample
32
, and 100% of the cessation sample; smokers comprise 71% 
of the total sample. Smokers in the total sample consumed an average of 8.90 cigarettes per 
                                                          
29
 The minimum age was 18.  The standard deviation is 2.60.  
30
 “Coloured” is an official term used in South Africa to refer to people of mixed race, especially people of Cape 
Malay origins. 
31
 The remaining 4% is categorised as “other” or “prefer not to answer.” 
32
 Subjects were considered current smokers if they answered “Yes” to the question “In your entire life, have 
you ever smoked at least 100 cigarettes?” and they had smoked in the last 2 days. 
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day, with a corresponding standard deviation of 5.29. The Fagerström Test for Nicotine 
Dependence (FTND) (Heatherton et al., 1991) is a common test used to measure smoking 
intensity. The mean FTND for the total sample of smokers was 3.12
33
, with a standard 
deviation of 2.05.   
 
TABLE I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Total 
 
  Number % or SD Number % or SD Number % or SD 
 
Black / African 63 43% 23 26% 86 37% 
 
Coloured 25 17% 25 28% 50 21% 
 
Indian 19 13% 18 20% 37 16% 
 
White 32 22% 20 22% 52 22% 
 
Male 76 52% 70 78% 146 62% 
 
Smokers 77 53% 89 99% 166 71% 
 
Age (Mean SD) 21.48 2.37 21.62 2.94 21.53 2.60 
 
Cigarettes (Mean SD) 8.42 5.89 9.58 4.84 8.90 5.29 
 
FTND (Mean SD) 2.81 2.00 3.49 1.98 3.12 2.05 
 
Sessions 8 
 
7 
 
15 
 
 
Median session size 18 
 
13 
 
17 
 
 
Observations 145   90   235   
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 A score of 3-4 is consistent with low to moderate nicotine dependence. 
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Section 4: Statistical methods 
The statistical methods used closely follow Andersen et al. (2008).  Time preferences and risk 
preferences are jointly estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. The associated log 
likelihood function can be adjusted to accommodate different utility functions, models of 
choice under risk, and discounting models.  A major benefit of this method is that the risk 
preference task can be used to estimate the utility function parameters, which allows the time 
preference task to focus on estimating the discounting parameters.  This section will first 
consider the estimation of risk preferences, then time preferences, and finally joint 
estimation. 
 
Risk Preferences 
Let the utility of income be expressed by a power utility function exhibiting constant relative 
risk aversion (CRRA):  
 
 U(y) = y
r
, (1) 
 
such that y represents a monetary prize in a lottery in the risk preference task, and r is the risk 
preference parameter to be estimated.  For the cases: r = 0, U(y) = ln y; and r < 0, U(y) = -y
r
 
(following Wakker (2008)).  Under EU Theory the utility function determines risk 
preferences, and thus in this parameterisation: r < 1 [r = 1] [r > 1] results in a concave 
[linear] [convex] utility function and risk averse [neutral] [loving] behaviour. 
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For a given risk preference lottery i, let there be 3 outcomes
34
 (such as in, e.g., Figure 1).  Let 
p(yj) be the probability of outcome yj occurring under that lottery, then the EU of lottery i can 
be expressed as: 
 
 EUi = ∑j=1,2,3 [p(yj)  × U(yj)] (2) 
 
The expected utility of a lottery is represented above as the sum of the utility of each outcome 
weighted by its probability.  The expected utilities can be calculated for each lottery pair 
(with EUR indicating the right-hand lottery, and EUL, the left-hand lottery), given an estimate 
of r, and thus an index formed: 
 
 ∇EU = EUR – EUL (3) 
 
A cumulative normal distribution function can be applied to this index in order to transform it 
into a probit function Φ(∇EU), the domain of which is the possible values of ∇EU (-∞,∞) and 
the range of which is the probability of lottery R being chosen [0,1]: 
 
 P(Choose lottery R) = Φ(∇EU) (4) 
 
In (3) when lotteries R and L have the same expected utility (i.e., EUR = EUL), then ∇EU=0, 
which in (4) results in Φ(∇EU) = Φ (0) = 0.5 indicating that the likelihood of picking lottery 
R is equal to that of lottery L.  Alternatively, if lottery R has greater [lesser] expected utility 
                                                          
34
 If the number of outcomes displayed is less than 3, then the probability of any non-displayed outcome is 
assumed to be zero. 
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than lottery L, then ∇EU>0 [∇EU<0], which results in Φ(∇EU) > 0.5 [Φ(∇EU) < 0.5] 
indicating that it is more [less] likely that lottery R will be chosen over lottery L. 
Assuming the CRRA utility function and the EU model are true, the likelihood of the risk 
preference responses depend upon the estimated value of r.  Thus, for the risk preference task 
the following conditional log likelihood function can be formed: 
 
 ln Li
RP(r; z, X) = ∑i[(ln Φ(∇EU) × I(zi = 1)) + (ln Φ(1 – ∇EU) × I(zi = 0))], (5) 
 
where the z parameter represents the indicator function I(.) with zi = 1 [zi = 0] indicating a 
choice of lottery R [L], and the X parameter denotes a vector of individual characteristics of 
the subject (gender, population group, income etc.). 
The structural maximum likelihood estimation approach allows for the easy estimation of 
dependent variables, specifically in this case the risk preference parameter r, as linear 
expressions of independent variables, specifically in this case the vector of individual 
characteristics X.  This may be represented by the expression: r = rα + rβ × X, such that rα is a 
fixed intercept and rβ is the vector of coefficients associated with the vector X (of individual 
characteristics).  Estimates of r have corresponding standard errors, which reflect the 
uncertainty of the point estimate.  A point estimate and an associated standard error provide 
more informative data than simply a point estimate by itself.
35
 
Additionally, the model allows for stochastic errors to be incorporated into the mechanism by 
which subjects choose between lotteries R and L (e.g., if the subject slightly prefers lottery R 
then the subject might make a mistake and pick lottery L instead).  Wilcox (2011) provides 
the construct of “contextual utility” (CU) which modifies EU by allowing for stochastic 
                                                          
35
 The standard error allows the calculation of the statistical significance of the point estimate, from which it can 
be determined whether the point estimate differs from zero. 
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choice. This normalises the ∇EU index by restricting the range to [0, 1] and incorporates a 
behavioural error term.  The augmented version of the ∇EU index of (3) can be seen below: 
 
 ∇EU = [(EUR – EUL) / λ ] / µ, (6) 
 
such that λ represents the normalising term and µ represents the behavioural error term.  
Specification (3) can be achieved by setting µ = 1.  As µ → 0 the choice between the lotteries 
tends towards an outcome solely determined by non-stochastic EU, while as µ → ∞ the 
choice between the lotteries tends towards an outcome solely determined by chance.  The log 
likelihood can be updated so that r as well as µ can be estimated: 
 
 ln Li
RP(r, µ; z, X) = ∑i[(ln Φ(∇EU) × I(zi = 1)) + (ln Φ(1 – ∇EU) × I(zi = 0))] (7) 
 
EU is not the only model of choice under risk – another commonly used model is the RDU 
model of Quiggin (1982). RDU differs from EU in that it assumes that subjects rank the 
outcomes of a lottery from worst to best, and then potentially distort the probabilities of the 
outcomes by attaching weights based on the rank of the outcome.  The EU specification (2) 
can be adjusted to an RDU specification as follows: 
 
 RDUi = ∑j=1,…,n [w(yi) × U(yi)], (8) 
 
such that 
 wj = π(pj + … + pn) – π(pj+1 + … + pn), (9) 
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for j = 1, … , n-1; and 
 
 wj = π(pj), (10) 
 
for j = n; with outcomes ranked from worst to best; and, such that  
 
 π(p) = pγ / [pγ + (1 – p)γ ] 1/γ, (11) 
 
for  0 < p < 1.  Expression (11) is a probability weighting function (PWF), which takes 
objective probabilities and transforms them into subjective weights, thus allowing for 
subjective distortions of probabilities. This specific PWF is popularly used and follows from 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992).  
The estimation of a RDU model, with RDU as defined above, requires little alteration to the 
EU model specified previously.  A PWF would replace the raw probabilities, and the log 
likelihood would estimate the parameter associated with the PWF, γ, in addition to r and µ.  
Alternative PWFs can be used (which would in turn require different parameters to be 
estimated). 
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Time Preferences 
Let the utility of income be represented by some function U(·).  The utility of income 
received at time t can be equated with the utility of income received at time t + τ through the 
use of discount factor, D: 
 
 U(yt) = D × U(yt + τ), (12) 
 
where 0 < D < 1.  There are different discount factors which can be used.  A commonly used 
discount factor is the exponential discount factor: 
 
 D
E(t) = 1 / (1 + δ)t, (13) 
 
such that t ≥ 0; and, with a discount rate of δ.  This model has distinct features in that the 
discount rate δ is constant over time, and that the geometric series ∑t→∞  D
E
(t) converges. 
When considering time preferences we measure a subject‟s preferences between SS and LL 
ammounts.  The SS prize can have a delay, thus (12) becomes: 
 
 [1 / (1 + δ)t]U(yt) = [1 / (1 + δ)
t+τ
]U(yt+τ), (14) 
 
such that the SS prize is received at t, and the LL prize is received at t + τ.  In the risk 
preference specification we use a measure of utility – described in (1).  Power utility can be 
substituted into (14) to yield:  
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 [1 / (1 + δ)t](yt)
r
 = [1 / (1 + δ)t+τ](yt+τ)
r
, (15) 
 
For expressions (14)-(15), the left hand side represents the present value (PV) of the utility of 
money of the SS amount, while the right hand side represents the PV of the utility of the LL 
amount.  Thus we can create the PV formulae: 
 
 PVSS = [1 / (1 + δ)
t
](yt)
r
, (16) 
 
and, 
 
 PVLL = [1 / (1 + δ)
t+τ
](yt+τ)
r
 (17) 
 
Similarly to the risk preferences section, an index can be formed which describes which prize 
will be preferred for a given δ and r: 
 
 ∇PV = (PVSS – PVLL) / ν, (18) 
 
where ν is a behavioural error term, similar in form to the behavioural error term of the risk 
preference task, µ. This index can then be transformed using a cumulative normal distribution 
function, which yields: 
 
 P(Choose SS reward) = Φ(∇PV) (19) 
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If PVSS = PVLL then ∇PV = 0, and Φ(∇PV) = 0.5, which indicates indifference between the 
SS and LL prizes. Alternatively, when Φ(∇PV) > 0.5 [< 0.5] the SS [LL] prize will be more 
likely to be chosen. 
Assuming the CRRA utility function, the EU model, and the exponential discounting model 
are true, the likelihood of the time preference responses depend on r, δ, µ, and ν.  Thus, for 
the time preference responses the following log likelihood function can be created: 
 
 ln Li
TP(r, δ, µ, ν; z, X) = ∑i[(ln Φ(∇PV) × I(zi = 1)) + (ln Φ(1 – ∇PV) × I(zi = 
0))] 
(20) 
 
The responses to the risk and time preference tasks can be estimated jointly using a log 
likelihood function maximising over the risk (7) and time (20) expressions: 
 
 ln Li(r, δ, µ, ν; z, X) = ln Li
RP
 + ln Li
TP
 (21) 
 
The joint model allows the estimation of risk preferences and time preferences. The joint 
estimation of risk preferences and time preferences allows for the estimation of risk 
preferences to construct a utility function which can be used in the estimation of time 
preferences. This is not possible when risk preferences and time preferences are estimated 
separately, and thus separate estimation leads to a loss in accuracy relative to joint estimation. 
Specifically, with regard to the possibility of the non-linear utility of money flows, the 
possible existence of which would confound the estimation of time preferences, as explained 
by Andersen et al. (2008).  
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Section 5: Results 
The data are analysed using a broad array of statistical specifications and metrics. This 
section will begin by presenting the risk preference results comparing smokers with non-
smokers. It will continue by presenting the time preference results comparing smokers with 
non-smokers. Lastly, this section will present risk preference and time preference results 
focussing on smoking intensity. 
a. Risk Preferences: Smokers vs. Non-Smokers 
Risk preferences are analysed using EU Theory and RDU theory. Each of these analyses is 
done first using an assumption of homogenous preferences across smokers and non-smokers, 
and then it is relaxed to account for heterogeneous preferences between smokers and non-
smokers as well as across various socio-economic factors. A variety of errors terms and 
probability weighting functions are used. 
Expected Utility Theory 
An initial simple analysis is displayed in Table II. It contains an EU model which uses a 
power utility function and a Contextual Utility (CU) error specification. The model estimates 
the parameters under the assumption that preferences are homogenous across the sample. The 
results account for clustering at the individual level, which occurs because subjects made 90 
choices each in the risk preference task so the observations are not independent. 
Risk aversion is found to be relatively high, which is indicated by the low value of r=0.446. 
The error term, μ, is found to be positive and statistically significant, which suggests that 
subjects did not act in a purely deterministic manner when completing the risk preference 
task but rather made behavioural errors, and therefore it is important to take this into account 
in all subsequent analyses. 
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TABLE II: EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
 
 
HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 
  
Model 
 
  
Power 
 
 
  CU Error 
 
 
Power function parameter (r) 0.446*** 
 
  
(0.022) 
 
 
Error (μ) 0.282*** 
 
 
  (0.011) 
 
 
N 21150 
 
 
log-likelihood -13834.308 
 
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
   
Table III displays an EU model with power utility and a CU error which relaxes the 
assumption of homogenous preferences. Preferences are allowed to vary across demographic, 
socio-economic, and smoking status characteristics. Additionally, there is a variable for 
whether the risk preference task was completed before the time preference task or vice versa.  
 
TABLE III: EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
 
 
HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 
  
Model 
  
 
  Estimate Std Error 
 
 
Power function parameter (r) 
   
 
Age -0.014** 0.006 
 
 
White 0.108* 0.063 
 
 
Male 0.120*** 0.045 
 
 
Commerce faculty 0.045 0.051 
 
 
Financial aid -0.053 0.045 
 
 
Smoker 0.021 0.043 
 
 
Constant 0.642*** 0.129 
 
 
Error (μ) 
   
 
Constant 0.277*** 0.011 
 
 
N 20700 
  
 
log-likelihood -13474   
 
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table III shows that a number of variables are statistically significant: older subjects are more 
risk averse and men are less risk averse than women. Additionally, white subjects are less 
risk averse than non-white subjects, although this is only significant at the 10% level. Of 
particular interest is that there are no statistically significant differences between smokers and 
non-smokers in this model. 
Rank-Dependant Utility Theory 
The previous EU models assume that there is no probability weighting; however, smokers 
could differ from non-smokers in their perception of probabilities. Thus in this section RDU 
models are used to account for potential differences in probability weighting. 
In order to use RDU models one has to employ a PWF. One such PWF is the TK PWF 
described in (11). This paper will utilise two other common PWFs. The Prelec (1998) PWF 
uses two parameters, and is defined by: 
 π(p) = exp[ -η(-ln p)γ], (22) 
such that γ > 0, η > 0, and 0 < p < 1. The Prelec PWF can achieve a broad range of functional 
forms: linear, S-shaped, and inverse S-shaped. The linear form describes the scenario where 
probabilities are accurately perceived. The S-shape form describes the scenario where low 
probabilities are underweighted and high probabilities are overweighted. The inverse S-shape 
form describes the scenario where low probabilities are overweighted and high probabilities 
are underweighted. It can also be purely concave or convex. 
 The power PWF is similar in form to the power utility function. It is expressed by: 
 π(p) = pγ, (23) 
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A notable feature of the power function is that while it can achieve concave, 
linear, and convex forms it cannot achieve an inverse S-shaped form, unlike the 
TK PWF or Prelec PWF. 
Table IV displays estimates of RDU models assuming a power utility function, 
a CU error specification, homogenous preferences, and three PWFs. In Model 1 
the hypothesis that the power PWF parameter γ is equal to 1 cannot be rejected 
(p=0.149) indicating a largely linear PWF. In Model 2 the TK PWF parameter γ 
is significantly less than 1 which indicates a PWF with an inverse S-shape. 
 TABLE IV: RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
 HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
  Power TK Prelec2 
 Power function parameter (r) 0.473*** 0.598*** 0.599*** 
  (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) 
 PWF parameter (γ) 1.069*** 0.675*** 0.583*** 
  (0.048) (0.015) (0.022) 
 PWF parameter (η)   0.999*** 
    (0.029) 
 Error (μ) 0.287*** 0.237*** 0.235*** 
  (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
 N 21150 21150 21150 
 log-likelihood -13829.222 -13465.39 -13449.433 
 Results account for clustering at the individual level  
 Standard errors in parentheses    
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
 
In Model 3 the Prelec PWF parameter γ is significantly less than 1, while the η parameter is 
not statistically different to 1. This indicates that, similar to the TK PWF, the Prelec PWF has 
an inverse S-shape. Across all three models the r parameter indicates risk aversion, and is 
similar in magnitude to the corresponding parameter found in the EU models. 
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Table V displays two RDU models with a power utility function, a CU error specification, 
heterogeneous preferences, and two PWFs. The TK PWF and the Prelec PWF are used in 
order to further investigate the inverse S-shape probability weighting. In both models 
smokers and non-smokers are not statistically significantly different in their power utility 
function or PWFs. There are some differences across several other variables. For example, 
financial aid is a statistically significant explanatory variable of the power utility function in 
Model 1, but not Model 2. 
Thus, regarding the differences between smokers and non-smokers, there is statistically 
significant evidence that probability weighting is of an inverse S-shaped form, but there is no 
statistically significant evidence that risk preferences differ between smokers and non-
smokers.  
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TABLE V: RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
 
HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model 1  Model 2 
  
TK Prelec 
 
  Estimate 
Std 
Error Estimate 
Std 
Error 
 
Power function parameter (r) 
    
 
Age -0.012 0.009 -0.008 0.009 
 
White 0.042 0.072 -0.030 0.066 
 
Male 0.117* 0.060 0.076 0.058 
 
Commerce faculty 0.065 0.065 -0.007 0.060 
 
Financial aid -0.088 0.056 -0.113** 0.057 
 
Smoker 0.032 0.054 0.011 0.053 
 
Constant 0.779*** 0.207 0.766*** 0.190 
 
PWF parameter (γ) 
    
 
Age -0.006 0.007 -0.002 0.012 
 
White 0.082* 0.045 0.079 0.055 
 
Male 0.027 0.037 0.025 0.047 
 
Commerce faculty -0.018 0.034 -0.048 0.045 
 
Financial aid 0.036 0.034 0.038 0.046 
 
Smoker -0.016 0.035 -0.017 0.048 
 
Constant 0.768*** 0.143 0.614** 0.255 
 
PWF parameter (η) 
    
 
Age 
  
0.015 0.013 
 
White 
  
-0.153** 0.063 
 
Male 
  
-0.080 0.070 
 
Commerce faculty 
  
-0.097* 0.056 
 
Financial aid 
  
-0.061 0.063 
 
Smoker 
  
-0.011 0.067 
 
_cons     0.826*** 0.289 
 
Error (μ) 
    
 
Constant 0.234*** 0.009 0.232*** 0.008 
 
N 20700 
 
20700 
 
 
log-likelihood -13096.4   -13064.3   
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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b. Time Preferences: Smokers vs. Non-Smokers 
Time preferences are analysed under the assumptions of linear utility, and by incorporating 
the curvature of the utility function identified by the risk preference task. Each of these 
analyses is done first using an assumption of homogenous preferences across smokers and 
non-smokers, and then it is relaxed to account for heterogeneous preferences between 
smokers and non-smokers as well as across various socio-economic factors. A variety of 
discount factors is used. 
Risk Neutral Discounting 
Four different discounting factors are used: Exponential as described in (13), Hyperbolic, 
Quasi-Hyperbolic, and Weibull. The exponential discount factor is time consistent, while the 
other three discount factors allow for time inconsistency. The other three are described 
below. Mazur‟s (1984) Hyperbolic (H) discount factor is given by the following expression: 
 D
H(t) = 1 / (1 + δt), (24) 
 
The Quasi-Hyperbolic (QH) discount factor is: 
 D
QH
(t) = 1  
D
QH(t) = β / (1 + δ)t, 
If t = 0 
If t > 0 
(25a) 
(25b) 
 
The Weibull (WB) discount factor is: 
 D
WB
(t) = exp(-δt(1/β)), (26) 
 
with β > 0 and δ > 0. 
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Table VI displays four discounting models with a linear utility function, Fechner error term, 
homogenous preferences, and four discounting factors. All the models indicate high time 
preference, with the Hyperbolic model having unusually high coefficients and a low log-
likelihood. 
 
 
TABLE VI: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
 
LINEAR UTILITY AND HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
  
Exponential Hyperbolic 
Quasi-
Hyperbolic Weibull 
 
Discounting parameter (δ) 3.635*** 34.860*** 2.645*** 0.767*** 
  
(0.234) (2.280) (0.171) (0.029) 
 
Discounting parameter (β) 
  
0.928*** 1.924*** 
    
(0.004) (0.044) 
 
Error (ν) 41.061*** 244.958*** 40.681*** 40.062*** 
 
  (2.579) (15.996) (2.418) (2.277) 
 
N 14100 14100 14100 14100 
 
log-likelihood -7512.467 -7752.028 -7121.229 -6829.21 
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Discounting with Concave Utility 
Table VII displays four discounting models with a power utility function, Fechner error term, 
homogenous preferences, and four discounting factors.  Comparing Table VI with Table VII 
it is apparent the relaxing of the assumption of a linear utility function led to substantially 
lower discount factor coefficients. The difference in results is to be expected given the 
general risk aversion which exists in the sample as displayed by Tables II and IV and the 
results of Andersen et al. (2008).
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TABLE VII: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
 
CONCAVE UTILITY AND HOMOGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
 
  Exponential Hyperbolic 
Quasi-
Hyperbolic Weibull 
 
Power function parameter (r) 0.447*** 0.462*** 0.441*** 0.437*** 
  
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
 
Discounting parameter (δ) 0.972*** 0.767*** 0.748*** 0.325*** 
  
(0.077) (0.049) (0.058) (0.019) 
 
Discounting parameter (β) 
  
0.964*** 2.019*** 
    
(0.003) (0.047) 
 
Risk error (μ) 0.282*** 0.279*** 0.283*** 0.284*** 
  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 
Time error (ν) 0.777*** 0.868*** 0.748*** 0.710*** 
 
  (0.137) (0.154) (0.130) (0.122) 
 
N 35250 35250 35250 35250 
 
log-likelihood -21325.938 -21239.493 -20889.889 -20570.476 
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
Tables VIII:A and VIII:B display four discounting models with an EU function, Fechner 
error term, heterogeneous preferences, and four discounting factors.  Being a smoker is found 
to be statistically significantly associated with high discount rates across all four models. For 
example, in Model 1 smokers discount at a 27 percentage point higher rate than non-smokers. 
                                                          
36
 The concave nature of most subjects‟ utility curves confounded the estimates of discounting parameters under 
the assumption of linear utility. 
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Several other statistically significant results include: being white or choosing over high 
principal options were associated with lower discount rates, while being in the commerce 
faculty or choosing over options with a FED were associated with higher discount rates. 
 
 
TABLE VIII:A: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
 
CONCAVE UTILITY, HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES  
  
Model 1 Model 2  
  
Exponential Hyperbolic 
 
  Estimate 
Std 
error Estimate 
Std 
error 
 
Power function parameter (r) 
    
 
Age -0.005 0.003 -0.005 0.003 
 
White 0.031 0.019 0.030 0.020 
 
Male -0.012 0.015 -0.012 0.016 
 
Commerce faculty 0.046*** 0.015 0.048*** 0.016 
 
Financial aid -0.012 0.017 -0.012 0.018 
 
Smoker 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.018 
 
Constant 0.530*** 0.072 0.551*** 0.076 
 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    
 
Age 0.003 0.025 0.004 0.015 
 
White -0.300** 0.121 -0.193** 0.078 
 
Male -0.099 0.106 -0.068 0.067 
 
Commerce faculty 0.230** 0.112 0.148** 0.068 
 
Financial aid -0.079 0.108 -0.050 0.068 
 
FED: 1 week 0.056* 0.029 0.045** 0.019 
 
High Principal -0.161*** 0.036 -0.105*** 0.021 
 
Smoker 0.268*** 0.103 0.166** 0.066 
 
Constant 0.930* 0.557 0.708** 0.333 
 
Risk error (μ) 
    
 
Constant 0.278*** 0.011 0.275*** 0.011 
 
Time error (ν) 
    
 
Constant 0.780*** 0.140 0.886*** 0.160 
 
N 34500 
 
34500 
 
 
log-likelihood -20672.9   -20574.3   
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
  
 52 
 
 
TABLE VIII:B: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
 
CONCAVE UTILITY, HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model 3  Model 4  
  
QHyp Weibull 
 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
 
Power function parameter (r) 
    
 
Age -0.006* 0.003 -0.005* 0.003 
 
White 0.025 0.019 0.016 0.016 
 
Male -0.009 0.014 -0.005 0.012 
 
Commerce faculty 0.035** 0.014 0.031*** 0.012 
 
Financial aid -0.009 0.016 -0.005 0.013 
 
Smoker 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.013 
 
Constant 0.548*** 0.068 0.517*** 0.059 
 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    
 
Age -0.004 0.018 -0.001 0.005 
 
White -0.097 0.088 -0.070*** 0.022 
 
Male -0.086 0.078 -0.011 0.020 
 
Commerce faculty 0.171** 0.083 0.036* 0.020 
 
Financial aid -0.026 0.083 -0.015 0.020 
 
FED: 1 week 0.692*** 0.072 0.336*** 0.022 
 
High Principal -0.068** 0.029 -0.028*** 0.006 
 
Smoker 0.156** 0.074 0.046** 0.020 
 
Constant 0.338 0.394 0.191 0.117 
 
Discounting parameter (β) 
    
 
Age -0.001 0.001 0.075 0.139 
 
White 0.024*** 0.006 0.958* 0.521 
 
Male -0.004 0.005 0.164 0.382 
 
Commerce faculty 0.002 0.005 -0.357 0.333 
 
Financial aid 0.005 0.006 0.098 0.342 
 
FED: 1 week 0.219*** 0.069 1.745*** 0.562 
 
High Principal 0.010*** 0.003 0.200 0.191 
 
Smoker -0.005 0.005 -0.691* 0.372 
 
Constant 0.955*** 0.03 2.335 2.974 
 
Risk error (μ) 
    
 
Constant 0.280*** 0.011 0.285*** 0.012 
 
Time error (ν) 
    
 
Constant 0.809*** 0.142 0.579*** 0.102 
 
N 34500 
 
34500 
 
 
log-likelihood -19877.2   -19401.1   
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Discounting with probability weighted utility 
Tables IX:A and IX:B displays four discounting models with an RDU function, Prelec PWF, 
Fechner error term, heterogeneous preferences, and four discounting factors.  Being a smoker 
is statistically significantly associated with higher discounting parameters across all 4 models. 
For example, in Model 1 smokers discount at a 45 percentage point higher rate than non-
smokers. Other results are generally similar to the results of the EU based models: variables 
White and High principal are associated with lower discounting parameters, and Commerce 
faculty and FED are associated with higher discounting parameters.  
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TABLE IX:A: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model 1 Model 2 
  
Prelec Exp Prelec Hyp 
 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
 
Power function parameter (r) 
    
 
Age -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.003 
 
White 0.025 0.021 0.025 0.022 
 
Male -0.027* 0.016 -0.028 0.017 
 
Commerce faculty 0.049*** 0.017 0.051*** 0.018 
 
Financial aid -0.01 0.019 -0.009 0.02 
 
Smoker 0.021 0.018 0.022 0.02 
 
Constant 0.657*** 0.076 0.724*** 0.084 
 
PWF parameter (γ) 
    
 
Age -0.004 0.011 -0.004 0.011 
 
White 0.062 0.054 0.059 0.052 
 
Male 0.052 0.046 0.052 0.045 
 
Commerce faculty -0.064 0.045 -0.063 0.044 
 
Financial aid 0.01 0.044 0.008 0.043 
 
Smoker -0.018 0.046 -0.018 0.046 
 
Constant 0.661*** 0.239 0.635*** 0.235 
 
PWF parameter (η) 
    
 
Age 0.018 0.012 0.019 0.013 
 
White -0.116* 0.062 -0.123* 0.065 
 
Male -0.159** 0.067 -0.166** 0.07 
 
Commerce faculty -0.061 0.056 -0.064 0.058 
 
Financial aid 0.016 0.063 0.018 0.066 
 
Smoker -0.004 0.061 -0.004 0.063 
 
Constant 0.771*** 0.282 0.808*** 0.296 
 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    
 
Age 0.004 0.042 0.005 0.022 
 
White -0.543*** 0.196 -0.323*** 0.118 
 
Male -0.138 0.173 -0.081 0.098 
 
Commerce faculty 0.340* 0.187 0.196* 0.101 
 
Financial aid -0.125 0.175 -0.073 0.101 
 
FED: 1 week 0.095* 0.051 0.080*** 0.03 
 
High Principal -0.332*** 0.074 -0.210*** 0.042 
 
Smoker 0.445*** 0.171 0.246** 0.099 
 
Constant 1.516 0.938 1.111** 0.502 
 
Risk error (μ) 
    
 
Constant 0.233*** 0.008 0.236*** 0.009 
 
Time error (ν) 
    
 
Constant 2.622*** 0.543 4.134*** 1.041 
 
N 34500 
 
34500 
 
 
log-likelihood -20213   -20076.1   
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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TABLE IX:B: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model 3  Model 4 
  
Prelec QH Prelec WB 
 
 Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
 
Power function parameter (r) 
    
 
Age -0.005 0.003 -0.004 0.003 
 
White 0.014 0.021 0.011 0.017 
 
Male -0.021 0.015 -0.014 0.013 
 
Commerce faculty 0.035** 0.015 0.031** 0.013 
 
Financial aid -0.009 0.017 -0.004 0.014 
 
Smoker 0.022 0.017 0.014 0.014 
 
Constant 0.670*** 0.072 0.625*** 0.064 
 
PWF parameter (γ) 
    
 
Age -0.004 0.011 -0.004 0.011 
 
White 0.066 0.055 0.068 0.056 
 
Male 0.050 0.046 0.05 0.047 
 
Commerce faculty -0.062 0.045 -0.062 0.046 
 
Financial aid 0.011 0.045 0.011 0.046 
 
Smoker -0.019 0.047 -0.019 0.048 
 
Constant 0.664*** 0.244 0.676*** 0.247 
 
PWF parameter (η) 
    
 
Age 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.012 
 
White -0.121* 0.062 -0.122** 0.061 
 
Male -0.153** 0.065 -0.145** 0.064 
 
Commerce faculty -0.069 0.055 -0.07 0.054 
 
Financial aid 0.017 0.062 0.021 0.061 
 
Smoker -0.003 0.060 -0.009 0.059 
 
Constant 0.791*** 0.272 0.759*** 0.273 
 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    
 
Age -0.001 0.028 -0.001 0.007 
 
White -0.163 0.125 -0.090*** 0.028 
 
Male -0.130 0.114 -0.013 0.025 
 
Commerce faculty 0.232* 0.122 0.043* 0.025 
 
Financial aid -0.036 0.122 -0.02 0.025 
 
FED: 1 week 1.050*** 0.118 0.389*** 0.026 
 
High Principal -0.106** 0.046 -0.043*** 0.008 
 
Smoker 0.226** 0.109 0.059** 0.025 
 
Constant 0.411 0.601 0.244 0.150 
 
Discounting parameter (β) 
    
 
Age -0.001 0.002 0.058 0.130 
 
White 0.027*** 0.009 0.901* 0.471 
 
Male -0.009 0.007 0.176 0.345 
 
Commerce faculty 0.002 0.006 -0.282 0.296 
 
Financial aid 0.006 0.009 0.102 0.322 
 
FED: 1 week 0.249*** 0.071 1.149*** 0.430 
 
High Principal 0.016*** 0.004 0.209 0.187 
 
Smoker -0.003 0.007 -0.643* 0.340 
 
Constant 0.930*** 0.039 2.531 2.733 
 
Risk error (μ) 
    
 
Constant 0.234*** 0.008 0.235*** 0.009 
 
Time error (ν) 
    
 
Constant 2.377*** 0.46 1.467*** 0.269 
 
N 34500 
 
34500 
 
 
log-likelihood -19433.9   -18977.2   
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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c. Risk Preferences, Time Preferences, and Smoking Intensity 
Differences in risk preferences and time preferences according to smoking intensity were 
analysed similarly to risk preferences and time preferences between smokers and non-
smokers. Two metrics were used to evaluate smoking intensity: FTND and a quadratic 
function of number of cigarettes smoked per day. This section will present a broad overview 
of the results. 
Risk preferences 
Table X displays two RDU models with a power utility function, the FTND metric, a CU 
error specification, heterogeneous preferences, and a Prelec PWF. The FTND metric is not 
statistically significantly related to the curvature of the utility function or to the PWF 
parameters. An EU model
37
 (similar to that of Table X but with no PWF) has generally 
consistent findings to that of Table X with regard to risk preferences, and specifically, FTND 
remains statistically insignificant. 
  
                                                          
37
 This model appears in Appendix B: Table 1. 
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TABLE X: RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
 
HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model  
  
Prelec 
 
  Estimate Std Error 
 
Power function parameter (ρ) 
  
 
Age 0.009 0.010 
 
White 0.086 0.099 
 
Male -0.035 0.077 
 
Commerce faculty 0.014 0.071 
 
Financial aid -0.141** 0.069 
 
FTND -0.015 0.018 
 
Constant 0.522** 0.213 
 
PWF parameter (γ) 
  
 
Age -0.011 0.010 
 
White 0.125* 0.065 
 
Male 0.009 0.06 
 
Commerce faculty -0.098* 0.052 
 
Financial aid 0.054 0.06 
 
FTND -0.006 0.013 
 
Constant 0.829*** 0.246 
 
PWF parameter (η) 
  
 
Age 0.035* 0.018 
 
White -0.088 0.077 
 
Male -0.093 0.083 
 
Commerce faculty -0.046 0.067 
 
Financial aid -0.051 0.088 
 
FTND 0.008 0.019 
 
Constant 0.333 0.417 
 
Error (μ) 
  
 
Constant 0.217*** 0.009 
 
N 12510 
 
 
log-likelihood -7816.79   
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table XI displays two RDU models with a power utility function, the number of cigarettes 
quadratic metric, a CU error specification, heterogeneous preferences, and a PWF (TK for 
Model 1 and Prelec for Model 2). These models, in contrast to that of Table X (which did not 
find FTND to be statistically significant) finds number of cigarettes to be statistically 
significant in both models and number of cigarettes squared to be statistically significant in 
Model 1. 
In both models a higher number of cigarettes smoked is associated with greater risk aversion. 
However, in Model 1 this relationship is found to be quadratic, and the greatest risk aversion 
(the peak of the parabola) is found at 13 cigarettes smoked per day. An EU model
38
 (similar 
to that of Table XI but with no PWF) has generally consistent findings to that of Table XI 
with regard to risk preferences. 
These models show that there is a relationship between smoking intensity and risk 
preferences, but that the exact nature of the relationship (whether it is linear or quadratic) 
may depend on the PWF specification. It may also be that with a larger sample size the 
quadratic term would be statistically significant in both models. 
  
                                                          
38
 This model is shown in Appendix B: Table 2. 
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TABLE XI: RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
 
HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model 1  Model 
  
TK Prelec 
 
  Estimate Std Error Estimate Std Error 
 
Power function parameter (r) 
    
 
Age -0.008 0.010 0.006 0.011 
 
White 0.176 0.109 0.115 0.092 
 
Male 0.066 0.087 0.005 0.079 
 
Commerce faculty 0.058 0.075 0.016 0.069 
 
Financial aid -0.092 0.071 -0.116* 0.068 
 
Number of cigarettes -0.052** 0.022 -0.042** 0.021 
 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
Constant 1.014*** 0.268 0.722*** 0.263 
 
PWF parameter (γ) 
    
 
Age -0.012** 0.005 -0.012 0.01 
 
White 0.102 0.062 0.144** 0.065 
 
Male 0.015 0.068 0.012 0.062 
 
Commerce faculty -0.050 0.041 -0.104** 0.052 
 
Financial aid 0.040 0.042 0.061 0.060 
 
Number of cigarettes -0.002 0.016 -0.004 0.018 
 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
Constant 0.932*** 0.153 0.875*** 0.238 
 
PWF parameter (η) 
    
 
Age 
  
0.033** 0.016 
 
White 
  
-0.110 0.086 
 
Male 
  
-0.083 0.083 
 
Commerce faculty 
  
-0.055 0.067 
 
Financial aid 
  
-0.051 0.08 
 
Number of cigarettes 
  
0.011 0.017 
 
Number of cigarettes squared 
  
0.000 0.001 
 
Constant     0.339 0.400 
 
Error (μ) 
    
 
Constant 0.217*** 0.01 0.215*** 0.009 
 
N 12510 
 
12510 
 
 
log-likelihood -7812.198 
 
-7785.95   
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
  
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Time Preferences 
Table XII displays two discounting models with an RDU function, FTND metric, Fechner 
error term, heterogeneous preferences, Prelec PWF, and two discounting factors (exponential 
and hyperbolic). The FTND metric is not statistically significantly related to the utility 
function or to the discounting parameters. Other discounting factors for the RDU model as 
well as a full EU model similar to that of Table XII
39
 have generally consistent findings to 
that of Table XII with regard to the utility function and time preferences, and specifically that 
FTND has no statistically significant relationship to discounting parameters. 
Table XIII displays two discounting models with an RDU function, the number of cigarettes 
quadratic metric, Fechner error term, heterogeneous preferences, Prelec PWF, and two 
discounting factors (exponential and hyperbolic). The cigarette metrics are not statistically 
significantly related to the discounting parameters. Other discounting factors for the EU 
model as well as a full RDU model similar to that of Table XIII
40
 have generally consistent 
findings to that of Table XIII with regard to the utility function and time preferences, and 
specifically that the cigarette metrics have no statistically significant relationships to 
discounting parameters. 
Table XII shows that the FTND metric does not correlate with time preferences, while Table 
X showed that FTND does not correlate with risk preferences. Number of cigarettes smoked 
per day does correlate with risk preferences (shown in Table XI), but does not correlate with 
time preferences (shown in table XIII). This shows that FTND and the number of cigarettes 
smoked per day are different measures of smoking intensity that have different relationships 
with risk preferences and time preferences. 
  
                                                          
39
 The RDU and EU model are shown in Appendix B: Table 3 and 4 (respectively). 
40
 The RDU and EU models are shown in Appendix B: Table 5 and 6 (respectively). 
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TABLE XII: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model 1 Model 2 
  
Exponential Hypberbolic 
 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
 
Power function parameter (r) 
    
 
Age -0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.005 
 
White 0.016 0.027 0.015 0.029 
 
Male -0.050** 0.023 -0.053** 0.024 
 
Commerce faculty 0.055** 0.023 0.059** 0.025 
 
Financial aid -0.022 0.023 -0.022 0.025 
 
FTND -0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.005 
 
Constant 0.697*** 0.104 0.773*** 0.115 
 
PWF parameter (γ) 
    
 
Age -0.010 0.011 -0.009 0.011 
 
White 0.142** 0.066 0.139** 0.065 
 
Male 0.010 0.057 0.012 0.056 
 
Commerce faculty -0.111** 0.052 -0.108** 0.051 
 
Financial aid 0.029 0.057 0.028 0.055 
 
FTND -0.011 0.014 -0.010 0.014 
 
Constant 0.836*** 0.257 0.798*** 0.255 
 
PWF parameter (η) 
    
 
Age 0.024 0.016 0.026 0.018 
 
White -0.136* 0.078 -0.142* 0.081 
 
Male -0.111 0.086 -0.115 0.090 
 
Commerce faculty -0.022 0.071 -0.023 0.074 
 
Financial aid 0.044 0.088 0.048 0.092 
 
FTND 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.018 
 
Constant 0.530 0.393 0.551 0.418 
 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    
 
Age 0.042 0.045 0.023 0.024 
 
White -0.113 0.270 -0.080 0.147 
 
Male -0.349 0.261 -0.180 0.135 
 
Commerce faculty 0.545** 0.248 0.292** 0.127 
 
Financial aid -0.066 0.304 -0.032 0.154 
 
FED: 1 week 0.095 0.07 0.080** 0.039 
 
High Principal -0.318*** 0.096 -0.200*** 0.050 
 
FTND 0.035 0.066 0.019 0.033 
 
Constant 0.920 1.065 0.839 0.570 
 
Risk error (μ) 
    
 
Constant 0.219*** 0.009 0.221*** 0.010 
 
Time error (ν) 
    
 
Constant 2.456*** 0.627 3.923*** 1.199 
 
N 20850 
 
20850 
 
 
log-likelihood -11965.98   -11868.92   
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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TABLE XIII: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Exponential Hyperbolic 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Power function parameter (r) 
    Age -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 
White 0.033 0.028 0.032 0.030 
Male -0.056*** 0.020 -0.059*** 0.021 
Commerce faculty 0.059*** 0.022 0.064*** 0.024 
Financial aid -0.012 0.026 -0.012 0.028 
Number of Cigarettes -0.010* 0.006 -0.010* 0.006 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Constant 0.703*** 0.096 0.777*** 0.108 
PWF parameter (γ) 
    Age -0.012 0.010 -0.011 0.010 
White 0.164** 0.064 0.161** 0.063 
Male 0.032 0.058 0.034 0.056 
Commerce faculty -0.118** 0.051 -0.115** 0.050 
Financial aid 0.035 0.058 0.034 0.057 
Number of Cigarettes -0.013 0.018 -0.012 0.018 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Constant 0.930*** 0.241 0.889*** 0.238 
PWF parameter (η) 
    Age 0.026* 0.015 0.028* 0.016 
White -0.169* 0.09 -0.178* 0.094 
Male -0.129 0.081 -0.132 0.084 
Commerce faculty -0.028 0.071 -0.029 0.074 
Financial aid 0.028 0.082 0.030 0.086 
Number of Cigarettes 0.031** 0.015 0.033** 0.016 
Number of cigarettes squared -0.001* 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 
Constant 0.381 0.383 0.393 0.405 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    Age 0.031 0.040 0.018 0.022 
White -0.283 0.291 -0.181 0.161 
Male -0.357 0.243 -0.187 0.129 
Commerce faculty 0.532** 0.253 0.290** 0.130 
Financial aid -0.111 0.276 -0.063 0.145 
FED: 1 week 0.096 0.067 0.084** 0.038 
High Principal -0.324*** 0.097 -0.209*** 0.049 
Number of Cigarettes 0.030 0.052 0.023 0.028 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 
Constant 1.036 1.000 0.841 0.542 
Risk error (μ) 
    Constant 0.218*** 0.009 0.219*** 0.010 
Time error (ν) 
    Constant 2.442*** 0.642 3.956*** 1.235 
N 20850 
 
20850 
 log-likelihood -11920.51   -11820.5   
Results account for clustering at the individual level     
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Section 6: Discussion 
There are two primary aspects of this research to discuss: smoking status, and smoking 
intensity. The results of smoking status will be discussed primarily in comparison to Harrison 
et al. (2018), as this dissertation sought to replicate the methods and analysis of that paper.
41
 
The results of smoking intenstiy represent an extension beyond both Harrison et al. (2018) 
and the rest of the literature. 
This paper analysed data produced by subjects who engaged in incentive-compatible 
experiments. The data were analysed using maximum likelihood estimation in order to avoid 
the pitfall – common in much of the literature – of treating point estimates as data during a 
second round of analysis. Both EU and RDU specifications were investigated. Various PWFs 
and discounting factors were used.  
I did not find smoking status to have any relationship with risk preferences across a range of 
specifications. This relationship replicates that which was found in Harrison et al. (2018). The 
literature is equivocal on the relationship between risk preferences and smoking status. 
However, much of the literature uses flawed experimental designs and flawed statistical 
methods, as expounded upon in the literature review. 
Across a range of specifications I found that smoking status was correlated with greater 
discounting. This relationship replicates that which was found in Harrison et al. (2018) and is 
broadly in line with the literature generally. 
I found that smoking intensity had a statistically significant relationship with risk preferences. 
This relationship was found when the smoking metric used was a number of cigarettes 
smoked quadratic, but not when the metric used was FTND. The turning point for quadratic 
                                                          
41
 It is worth noting that Harrison et al. (2018) had a sample of 175 individuals, while this paper has a sample of 
235. Thus, while differences may be attributable to different samples, they may also be attributable to a 
difference in statistical power. 
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was 13 cigarettes per day – people who smoke 13 cigarettes per day tend to be more risk-
loving than people who smoke more than or less than them. 
Of the little research on the relationship between smoking intensity and risk preferences, all 
other research fails to find a significant relationship between smoking intensity and risk 
preferences. There may be several reasons why this experiment departs from the norm: 
experimental design (this dissertation has real rewards as opposed to hypothetical rewards); 
sample size (this dissertation has a relatively large size as opposed to the typically small 
samples of studies which use real rewards); smoking intensity metric (this dissertation used 
both FTND and number of cigarettes smoked, whereas other studies often only use one 
metric); and others, as discussed in detail in the literature review. It may also just be the 
sample – a replication of this dissertation is necessary to see whether the results are specific 
to the sample.   
Across a range of specifications this dissertation did not find smoking intensity to have any 
relationship with discounting. This occurs across both metrics for smoking intensity. By 
contrast, most other research finds greater smoking intensity to be correlated with greater 
discounting, albeit Harrison et al. (2018) found a parabolic relationship. 
It should be noted that other studies of smoking intensity have had samples with a higher 
mean number of cigarettes smoked. In this dissertation smokers had a mean of 8.90 cigarettes 
smoked per day. By comparison, for example, Ohmura (2005) smokers had a mean of 14.38 
cigarettes smoked per day, while in Reynolds et al. (2004) all smokers had a minimum of 20 
cigarettes smoked per day. There is a similar situation when comparing results to studies such 
as Ida and Goto (2009) and Ida (2009) where FTND was used to measure smoking intensity – 
heavy smokers were rarer in this study than others occurring in the literature. The lower 
smoking intensity in this study may explain why this study has different findings with regard 
 65 
 
to the relationship between time preferences and smoking intensity compared to other studies 
in the literature. 
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Section 7: Conclusion 
This dissertation set out to investigate how risk preferences and time preferences relate to 
tobacco use. The primary findings are that: smokers discount more than non-smokers; 
smokers do not differ on risk preferences compared to non-smokers; smoking intensity has no 
relationship with time preferences; and, smoking intensity is correlated with risk preferences, 
such that greater smoking intensity is associated with lower risk aversion (although the 
relationship appears to be quadratic, with very heavy smokers being more risk averse than 
heavy smokers). 
This dissertation has a number of limitations: the sample is primarily students (and thus the 
findings may not generalise to the entire population); there were few heavy smokers relative 
to other studies on smoking intensity; the study has a South African sample (and thus the 
findings may not generalise to significantly richer or poorer countries). 
The findings of this dissertation regarding the difference between smokers and non-smokers 
replicate findings common in the literature. The findings regarding smoking intensity differ 
from the findings common in the literature. These differences may occur because of the 
paucity of research in this area, differences in statistical methods or experimental design, or 
due to the idiosyncratic nature of the sample used in this dissertation. 
From a public policy perspective, given that smokers discount more than non-smokers, 
programmes which highlight the long run (or delayed) costs of smoking (e.g., health 
advisories) may not be highly effective, while policies which increase the short run (or 
immediate) costs of smoking (e.g., taxes on cigarettes) are likely to be relatively more 
effective. An intervention targeting heavier smokers could benefit from the knowledge that 
heavier smokers tend to be less risk averse by focusing the intervention on social spaces 
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renowned for low risk aversion (such as casinos or horse racecourses) instead of areas 
renowned for moderate or high risk aversion. 
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Appendix A: Risk preference task instructions 
Task Instructions 
 
This is a task where you will choose between lotteries with varying prizes and 
chances of winning. On each computer screen you will be presented with a pair of 
lotteries and you will need to choose one of them. There are 90 pairs of lotteries in 
this task. For each pair of lotteries, you should choose the lottery you prefer to 
play. You will actually get the chance to play one of the lotteries you choose, and 
you will be paid according to the outcome of that lottery, so you should think 
carefully about which lottery you prefer. 
 
Here is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of lotteries might 
look like. 
 
 
  
The outcome of the lotteries will be determined by the draw of a random number 
between 1 and 100. Each number between, and including, 1 and 100 is equally 
likely to occur. In fact, you will be able to draw the number yourself using two 10-
sided dice. 
 
In the above example, the Left lottery pays R20 with a 55% chance, R160 with a 
25% chance and R190 with a 20% chance. So when you roll the two 10-sided dice 
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if the number drawn is between 1 and 55 you will be paid R20, if the number is 
between 56 and 80 you will be paid R160, and if the number is between 81 and 100 
you will be paid R190. The blue colour in the pie chart corresponds to 55% of the 
area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 1 and 55 
and your prize will be R20. The orange area in the pie chart corresponds to 25% of 
the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 56 and 
80 and your prize will be R160. The green area in the pie chart corresponds to 20% 
of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 81 
and 100 and your prize will be R190. 
 
Now look at the Right lottery in the example. It pays R20 with a 75% chance, and 
R250 with a 25% chance. So when you roll the two 10-sided dice if the number 
drawn is between 1 and 75 you will be paid R20, and if the number is between 76 
and 100 you will be paid R250. The blue colour in the pie chart corresponds to 
75% of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 
1 and 75 and your prize will be R20. The green area in the pie chart corresponds to 
25% of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 
76 and 100 and your prize will be R250.  
 
Each pair of lotteries is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each 
screen, you should indicate which lottery you prefer to play by clicking on one of 
the buttons beneath the lotteries.  
 
You could also get a pair of lotteries in which one of the lotteries will give you the 
chance to play “Double or Nothing.” For instance, the Right lottery in the 
following screen image pays “Double or Nothing” if the Green area is selected. 
The right pie chart indicates that there is a 50% chance that you get R0. So if you 
roll the two 10-sided dice and the number drawn is between 1 and 50 you will be 
paid R0. However, if the number is between 51 and 100 you will toss a coin to 
determine if you get double the amount listed in green (R210). If the coin comes 
up Heads you get R420, otherwise you get nothing. The prizes listed underneath 
each pie refer to the amounts before any “Double or Nothing” coin toss. 
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For instance, suppose you picked the lottery on the left in the last example. If the 
random number drawn was 37, you would win R60; if it was 93, you would get 
R110. 
 
If you picked the lottery on the right and drew the number 37, you would get R0; if 
instead you drew 93, you would have to toss a coin to determine if you get 
“Double or Nothing.” If the coin comes up Heads then you get R420. However, if 
it comes up Tails you get nothing from your chosen lottery. 
 
After you have worked through all of the 90 pairs of lotteries, raise your hand and 
an experimenter will come to you to determine your payment for this task. You 
will roll two 10-sided dice until a number between 1 and 90 comes up to determine 
which pair of lotteries will be played out. Since there is a chance that any of your 
90 choices could be played out for real, you should approach each pair of lotteries 
as if it is the one that you will play out. Finally, you will roll the two ten-sided dice 
again to determine the outcome of the lottery you chose, and if necessary you will 
then toss a coin to determine if you get “Double or Nothing.” 
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It is also possible that you will be given a lottery in which there is a “Double or 
Nothing” option no matter what number you roll with the two 10-sided dice. The 
screen image below illustrates this possibility. The Right lottery in the example pays 
“Double or Nothing” for any number that is drawn with the two 10-sided dice. So 
if you select the Right lottery and roll a number between 1 and 50 you will toss a 
coin to see whether you get R0 or R120 (double R60). If you roll a number 
between 51 and 100 you will toss a coin to see whether you get R0 or R420 
(double R210). 
 
 
  
 
Therefore, your earnings for this task are determined by four things: 
 
 by which lottery you selected, the Left or the Right, for each of these 90 pairs; 
 by which lottery pair is chosen to be played out in the set of 90 such pairs using 
the two 10-sided dice;  
 by the outcome of that lottery when you roll the two 10-sided dice; and  
 by the outcome of a coin toss if the chosen lottery outcome is of the “Double 
or Nothing” type. 
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Which lotteries you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The people next to you 
may be presented with different lotteries, and may have different preferences, so 
their responses should not matter to you. Please work silently, and make your 
choices by thinking carefully about each lottery. 
 
Payment for this task is in cash, and is in addition to the R40 show-up fee that you 
receive just for being here. When you have finished the task, please raise your hand 
and an experimenter will come to you to determine your payment for this task. 
 
 
Please raise your hand now 
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Appendix A: Time preference task instructions 
Task Instructions 
 
In this task you will choose between different amounts of money available at 
different times. You will need to make 60 choices in total. For each choice you will 
decide between a smaller amount of money which is available sooner and a larger 
amount of money which is available later. One of your 60 choices will be selected 
at random for payment and you will receive the amount of money you chose at the 
appropriate date. 
 
All of these choices will be made on a computer and here is an example of what 
the computer display might look like: 
 
 
 
For the purpose of explaining this task, assume for the moment that today is 29 
September, 2016. At the top of the display is a calendar showing you today’s date 
in a circle (29 September 2016). This date is also highlighted in purple and a future 
date is highlighted in green (13 October 2016). Below the calendar are two 
columns: a purple column with amounts of money available at an earlier date 
(today) and a green column with amounts of money available at a later date (in 14 
days from today). You need to make 4 choices on this screen. Each choice appears 
on a different row. 
 
In the first row, you need to choose between receiving R300 today or R301.73 in 
14 days from today. Note that R300 is the smaller of the two amounts but it is 
available today. R301.73 is the larger of the two amounts but it is only available 
after 14 days. Suppose that you prefer R300 today over R301.73 in 14 days from 
today. To choose R300 today just click the button saying “Select” under “R300 
today”. 
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Suppose instead that you prefer R301.73 in 14 days rather than R300 today. To 
choose R301.73 in 14 days just click the button saying “Select” under “R301.73 in 
14 days”.  
Once you have made your choice on the first row you can move on to the other 
rows on the screen. You need to make 4 choices on the screen before you can 
move on to the next set of 4 choices on a new screen. Once you have made all of 
your choices on the screen you can click the button saying “Confirm” to move on 
to the next screen. If you would like to change your choices then click “Cancel”. 
 
You will need to make 60 choices in total across 15 screens. The rand amounts 
change on each row of each screen. In addition, the times for delivery of the rand 
amounts change across screens. For example, on the screen we just looked at, you 
had to choose between an amount of money available today and an amount of 
money available in 14 days. On a different screen, you may need to choose 
between an amount of money available in 7 days and another amount of money 
available in 21 days. So please pay careful attention when making your choices. 
 
When you are finished the task, please raise your hand and an experimenter will 
come to you to determine your payment for this task. You will select one of the 15 
screens from this task by rolling a 20-sided dice. If the dice lands on 1, you will 
select screen 1; if the dice lands on 7, you will select screen 7; if the dice lands on 
12, you will select screen 12; and so on. If the dice lands on 16, 17, 18, 19 or 20, 
you will roll the dice again until it lands on a number between 1 and 15.  
 
Once you have selected a screen, you will roll a 4-sided dice to select 1 of the 4 
rows on the screen. If the dice lands on 1, you will select row 1; if the dice lands on 
2, you will select row 2; and so on. Once you have selected the row, we will look at 
the choice that you made on that row. You will then be paid for the choice that 
you made on that row on the date listed for that choice. For instance, in the last 
example, suppose that row 3 is selected for payment. If you chose R300 today, you 
will be paid R300 at the end of today’s session. If you chose R317.51 in 14 days 
then you will be paid R317.51 in 14 days via electronic transfer into your bank 
account and you will receive a payment notification on your cellphone when the 
transaction has taken place. That is why we need your bank account details: to pay 
you via electronic transfer, if necessary. 
 
Note that the option you prefer on each row is a matter of personal taste. The 
people next to you may have different tastes so their choices should not matter for 
you. Please work silently and make your choices by thinking carefully about each 
option. Since there is a chance that any of your 60 choices could be selected for 
payment, you should approach each choice as if it is the one that you will be paid 
for.  
Please raise your hand now 
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Appendix B: Table 1 
 
TABLE 1: EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
 
HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model 
 
 
  Estimate Std Error 
 
Power function parameter (r) 
  
 
Age -0.012* 0.006 
 
White 0.205** 0.094 
 
Male 0.038 0.063 
 
Commerce faculty 0.016 0.067 
 
Financial aid -0.084 0.062 
 
FTND -0.019 0.015 
 
Constant 0.748*** 0.154 
 
Error (μ) 
  
 
Constant 0.261*** 0.012 
 
N 12510 
 
 
log-likelihood -8094.047   
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix B: Table 2 
 
TABLE 2: EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY ML ESTIMATES 
 
HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model 
 
 
  Estimate Std Error 
 
Power function parameter (r) 
  
 
Age -0.019*** 0.006 
 
Male 0.116** 0.057 
 
Commerce faculty 0.01 0.07 
 
Number of cigarettes -0.052*** 0.019 
 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.002** 0.001 
 
Constant 1.082*** 0.184 
 
Error (μ) 
  
 
Constant 0.265*** 0.013 
 
N 12510 
 
 
log-likelihood -8115.631   
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
  
 80 
 
Appendix B: Table 3 
 
TABLE 3: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model 3  Model 4 
  
Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
 
 Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
 
Power function parameter (r) 
    
 
Age -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.003 
 
White 0.013 0.026 0.006 0.021 
 
Male -0.048** 0.019 -0.032* 0.016 
 
Commerce faculty 0.040* 0.021 0.036** 0.018 
 
Financial aid -0.021 0.02 -0.008 0.017 
 
FTND -0.004 0.005 -0.006 0.004 
 
Constant 0.693*** 0.087 0.651*** 0.073 
 
PWF parameter (γ) 
    
 
Age -0.01 0.011 -0.01 0.011 
 
White 0.143** 0.067 0.149** 0.069 
 
Male 0.009 0.058 0.005 0.06 
 
Commerce faculty -0.109** 0.053 -0.112** 0.055 
 
Financial aid 0.029 0.058 0.029 0.059 
 
FTND -0.011 0.014 -0.011 0.015 
 
Constant 0.846*** 0.259 0.865*** 0.264 
 
PWF parameter (η) 
    
 
Age 0.023 0.016 0.022 0.016 
 
White -0.137* 0.077 -0.140* 0.076 
 
Male -0.11 0.085 -0.097 0.084 
 
Commerce faculty -0.032 0.071 -0.035 0.069 
 
Financial aid 0.045 0.088 0.055 0.086 
 
FTND 0.013 0.017 0.012 0.017 
 
Constant 0.543 0.387 0.521 0.381 
 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    
 
Age 0.025 0.032 0.006 0.007 
 
White -0.024 0.182 -0.028 0.045 
 
Male -0.297 0.181 -0.06 0.074 
 
Commerce faculty 0.328* 0.168 0.058 0.037 
 
Financial aid -0.092 0.196 -0.027 0.07 
 
FED: 1 week 1.174*** 0.154 0.389*** 0.036 
 
High Principal -0.051 0.065 -0.044*** 0.012 
 
FTND 0.023 0.043 0.007 0.012 
 
Constant -0.014 0.734 0.151 0.158 
 
Discounting parameter (β) 
    
 
Age 0 0.002 -0.057 0.053 
 
White 0.009 0.01 0.249 0.571 
 
Male -0.017 0.011 0.831 0.914 
 
Commerce faculty 0.002 0.009 -0.292 0.507 
 
Financial aid -0.01 0.012 0.502 1.044 
 
FED: 1 week 0.277*** 0.096 1.211* 0.657 
 
High Principal 0.022*** 0.006 0.114 0.29 
 
FTND -0.001 0.002 -0.059 0.141 
 
Constant 0.909*** 0.048 4.132*** 1.367 
 
Risk error (μ) 
    
 
Constant 0.219*** 0.009 0.221*** 0.009 
 
Time error (ν) 
    
 
Constant 2.415*** 0.572 1.433*** 0.32 
 
N 20850 
 
20850 
 
 
log-likelihood -11438.076   -11153.043   
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
  
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix B: Table 4 
TABLE 4:A: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
CONCAVE UTILITY, HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HOMOSCEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Model 1 Model 2  
 
Exponential Hyperbolic 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Power function parameter (r) 
    Age -0.005 0.005 -0.006 0.005 
White 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.025 
Male -0.040* 0.021 -0.042* 0.022 
Commerce faculty 0.048** 0.021 0.051** 0.022 
Financial aid -0.026 0.023 -0.027 0.024 
FTND -0.007 0.005 -0.007 0.005 
Constant 0.623*** 0.102 0.653*** 0.108 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    Age 0.03 0.03 0.018 0.018 
White -0.042 0.175 -0.033 0.104 
Male -0.257 0.169 -0.152 0.096 
Commerce faculty 0.374** 0.16 0.224** 0.092 
Financial aid -0.037 0.192 -0.019 0.109 
FED: 1 week 0.062 0.043 0.049* 0.026 
High Principal -0.164*** 0.051 -0.106*** 0.028 
FTND 0.018 0.041 0.01 0.023 
Constant 0.584 0.697 0.531 0.414 
Risk error (μ) 
    Constant 0.264*** 0.013 0.261*** 0.012 
Time error (ν) 
    Constant 0.860*** 0.2 0.989*** 0.234 
N 20850 
 
20850 
 log-likelihood -12286.094   -12212.851   
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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TABLE 4:B: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
CONCAVE UTILITY, HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HOMOSCEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Model 3  Model 4  
 
Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Power function parameter (r) 
    Age -0.005 0.004 -0.005 0.003 
White 0.025 0.023 0.014 0.019 
Male -0.038** 0.018 -0.026* 0.015 
Commerce faculty 0.035* 0.02 0.032** 0.016 
Financial aid -0.023 0.02 -0.012 0.016 
FTND -0.006 0.005 -0.007 0.004 
Constant 0.621*** 0.087 0.581*** 0.073 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    Age 0.014 0.022 0.005 0.006 
White 0.017 0.134 -0.022 0.037 
Male -0.219* 0.127 -0.05 0.062 
Commerce faculty 0.246** 0.122 0.050* 0.031 
Financial aid -0.059 0.134 -0.02 0.06 
FED: 1 week 0.812*** 0.101 0.348*** 0.03 
High Principal -0.038 0.045 -0.031*** 0.009 
FTND 0.012 0.03 0.005 0.01 
Constant 0.077 0.511 0.111 0.129 
Discounting parameter (β) 
    Age -0.001 0.002 -0.058 0.062 
White 0.011 0.008 0.224 0.632 
Male -0.01 0.009 0.854 0.997 
Commerce faculty 0.001 0.007 -0.385 0.599 
Financial aid -0.007 0.009 0.499 1.198 
FED: 1 week 0.250*** 0.095 1.671 1.047 
High Principal 0.015*** 0.005 0.113 0.301 
FTND -0.001 0.002 -0.047 0.164 
Constant 0.949*** 0.042 4.265*** 1.515 
Risk error (μ) 
    Constant 0.266*** 0.013 0.271*** 0.013 
Time error (ν) 
    Constant 0.934*** 0.213 0.651*** 0.146 
N 20850 
 
20850 
 log-likelihood -11750.88   -11454.494   
Results account for clustering at the individual level   
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix B: Table 5 
 
TABLE 5: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
 
RANK-DEPENDENT UTILITY AND HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES 
  
Model 3  Model 4 
  
Prelec2QH Prelec2 WB 
 
 Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
 
Power function parameter (r) 
    
 
Age -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
 
White 0.026 0.026 0.017 0.021 
 
Male -0.053*** 0.018 -0.037*** 0.014 
 
Commerce faculty 0.045** 0.021 0.039** 0.017 
 
Financial aid -0.015 0.021 -0.007 0.018 
 
Number of cigarettes -0.009 0.006 -0.007* 0.004 
 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Constant 0.704*** 0.085 0.643*** 0.065 
 
PWF parameter (γ) 
    
 
Age -0.012 0.010 -0.012 0.010 
 
White 0.167** 0.066 0.173** 0.067 
 
Male 0.030 0.059 0.027 0.061 
 
Commerce faculty -0.117** 0.052 -0.120** 0.053 
 
Financial aid 0.036 0.059 0.036 0.060 
 
Number of cigarettes -0.014 0.019 -0.014 0.019 
 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
Constant 0.942*** 0.243 0.964*** 0.247 
 
PWF parameter (η) 
    
 
Age 0.024 0.015 0.024 0.015 
 
White -0.173* 0.089 -0.175** 0.088 
 
Male -0.127 0.080 -0.114 0.079 
 
Commerce faculty -0.037 0.070 -0.040 0.069 
 
Financial aid 0.025 0.081 0.031 0.080 
 
Number of cigarettes 0.032** 0.015 0.032** 0.015 
 
Number of cigarettes squared -0.001* 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 
 
Constant 0.401 0.374 0.364 0.369 
 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    
 
Age 0.019 0.030 0.004 0.006 
 
White -0.072 0.191 -0.059 0.046 
 
Male -0.312* 0.173 -0.061 0.056 
 
Commerce faculty 0.330** 0.166 0.054 0.038 
 
Financial aid -0.084 0.186 -0.035 0.058 
 
FED: 1 week 1.157*** 0.157 0.390*** 0.039 
 
High Principal -0.044 0.066 -0.039*** 0.011 
 
Number of cigarettes 0.003 0.047 0.007 0.010 
 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
 
Constant 0.107 0.728 0.153 0.154 
 
Discounting parameter (β) 
    
 
Age 0.000 0.002 -0.051 0.064 
 
White 0.016 0.012 0.599 0.576 
 
Male -0.017 0.012 0.968 0.772 
 
Commerce faculty 0.003 0.008 -0.247 0.509 
 
Financial aid -0.006 0.013 0.648 0.891 
 
FED: 1 week 0.272*** 0.098 1.053** 0.529 
 
High Principal 0.022*** 0.006 0.037 0.259 
 
Number of cigarettes -0.003 0.003 -0.096 0.171 
 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.007 
 
Constant 0.925*** 0.050 4.389** 1.836 
 
Risk error (μ) 
    
 
Constant 0.218*** 0.009 0.219*** 0.010 
 
Time error (ν) 
    
 
Constant 2.352*** 0.562 1.435*** 0.329 
 
N 20850 
 
20850 
 
 
log-likelihood -11393.724   
-
11103.698   
 
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
  
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix B: Table 6 
TABLE 6:A: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
CONCAVE UTILITY, HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HOMOSCEDASTIC ERRORS 
 
Model 1 Model 2  
 
Exponential Hyperbolic 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Power function parameter (r) 
    Age -0.004 0.004 -0.005 0.005 
White 0.046* 0.026 0.045* 0.028 
Male -0.043** 0.018 -0.046** 0.019 
Commerce faculty 0.051** 0.021 0.054** 0.022 
Financial aid -0.016 0.025 -0.017 0.027 
Number of Cigarettes -0.012** 0.006 -0.012** 0.006 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
Constant 0.641*** 0.099 0.670*** 0.107 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    Age 0.024 0.029 0.016 0.018 
White -0.142 0.190 -0.097 0.115 
Male -0.266* 0.161 -0.158* 0.093 
Commerce faculty 0.368** 0.163 0.222** 0.094 
Financial aid -0.055 0.176 -0.032 0.102 
FED: 1 week 0.064 0.042 0.053** 0.025 
High Principal -0.167*** 0.052 -0.111*** 0.028 
Number of Cigarettes 0.012 0.035 0.011 0.020 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Constant 0.672 0.682 0.542 0.411 
Risk error (μ) 
    Constant 0.262*** 0.013 0.260*** 0.013 
Time error (ν) 
    Constant 0.858*** 0.201 0.992*** 0.237 
N 20850 
 
20850 
 log-likelihood -12262.218   -12187.115   
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
 
  
 85 
 
TABLE 6:B: DISCOUNTING FUNCTION ML ESTIMATES 
CONCAVE UTILITY, HETEROGENOUS PREFERENCES AND HOMOSCEDASTIC 
ERRORS 
 
Model 3  Model 4  
 
Quasi-Hyperbolic Weibull 
  Estimate Std error Estimate Std error 
Power function parameter (r) 
    Age -0.005 0.004 -0.004 0.003 
White 0.041* 0.025 0.026 0.020 
Male -0.040** 0.017 -0.029** 0.012 
Commerce faculty 0.040** 0.019 0.035** 0.016 
Financial aid -0.016 0.021 -0.010 0.017 
Number of Cigarettes -0.011* 0.006 -0.009** 0.004 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
Constant 0.643*** 0.087 0.581*** 0.066 
Discounting parameter (δ) 
    Age 0.010 0.021 0.004 0.005 
White -0.006 0.140 -0.045 0.039 
Male -0.229* 0.123 -0.051 0.048 
Commerce faculty 0.247** 0.121 0.047 0.031 
Financial aid -0.048 0.128 -0.025 0.049 
FED: 1 week 0.803*** 0.102 0.348*** 0.032 
High Principal -0.036 0.045 -0.027*** 0.009 
Number of Cigarettes -0.007 0.034 0.005 0.008 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Constant 0.186 0.509 0.112 0.128 
Discounting parameter (β) 
    Age -0.001 0.002 -0.053 0.075 
White 0.019** 0.009 0.573 0.660 
Male -0.010 0.009 1.015 0.854 
Commerce faculty 0.001 0.007 -0.352 0.613 
Financial aid -0.003 0.010 0.642 1.026 
FED: 1 week 0.241** 0.096 1.467 0.926 
High Principal 0.015*** 0.005 0.020 0.282 
Number of Cigarettes -0.003 0.003 -0.085 0.180 
Number of cigarettes squared 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 
Constant 0.964*** 0.042 4.576** 2.053 
Risk error (μ) 
    Constant 0.264*** 0.013 0.270*** 0.013 
Time error (ν) 
    Constant 0.919*** 0.211 0.652*** 0.148 
N 20850 
 
20850 
 log-likelihood -11726.62   -11428.276   
Results account for clustering at the individual level 
  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
    
 
